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on a particular theme, giving prominence to international, comparative 
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I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Are immigration control policies still possible, and if so, do they matter? At the 
beginning of the 1970s, it was still relatively easy to characterize the European 
Union countries with regard to immigration: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain or 
Ireland were seen as traditional nations of emigration: France had a tradition of 
large-scale immigration since the end of the nineteenth century; Great Britain, 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany or the Netherlands only became 
nations of immigration after the Second World War. In 1997, however, all these 
countries, except Ireland, are host of the permanent settlement of immigrants, 
regardless of their different histories. Furthermore, received wisdom is that all 
of these countries face the same general risk with regard to immigration: a 
massive, uncontrollable ‘invasion’ of the North by the poverty stricken from the 
South, and additionally a potential movement from the East to the West.
A. The Double Failure of Stateless Theories
It is true that having originated primarily in developing countries, immigrant 
populations tend to choose developed countries as their destination: figures from 
the United Nations show that in 1990, 45% of 120 million migrants in the world 
were concentrated in these areas: the United States (16%), Europe (22%), Japan, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.1 While the South-North migration 
represents approximately half of international migration, the northern host 
countries represent only 17.4% of the world’s total population. Except for a 
small proportion of the immigrants into Germany, immigrant arrivals tend to 
settle in regions of the host country where immigrant populations are already 
concentrated. In the United States, 70% of new immigrants are concentrated in 
six States: California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey.2 In 
France, Michelle Guillon has demonstrated that while the percentage of 
foreigners in metropolitan France declined slightly from 6.8% to 6.4% between 
1982 and 1990, the percentage of the foreign population in and around the Paris 
area increased from 36.3% in 1982 to 38% in 1990, while polarization between 
neighbourhoods with high and low immigrant populations also dramatically 
increased.3 This visibly increased concentration of immigrants in certain areas 
of host nations, coinciding with periods of economic crisis experienced by these 
nations, has led in recent years to a public perception that national identity or the 
economic livelihood of the indigenous residents of such countries is being 
threatened by immigration.
1 Data provided by Zlotnik, Hania, Population Division, United Nations.
2 US commission on Immigration Reform, Legal Immigration: Setting priorities f 1995) 
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Such a concentration of immigrants often leads political representatives of 
these areas to identify the localized influx of immigrants as a problem, and to 
describe the phenomenon by employing a vocabulary of ‘invasion’, thereby 
placing the question on the national political agenda.
It is this perception of an ever-increasing migratory pressure which explicitly 
or implicitly underlies most explanations of the similarity of the situations in the 
northern industrialized nations. With projections of population growth in the 
Third World serving as an ever-present warning, the common perspective on the 
future of North-South relations is often dominated by visions of a massive and 
unavoidable movement of Africans towards Europe, of Latin Americans or 
Asians towards the United States, and of East- and Southeast Asians to Japan.
1. Theories o f the Decline o f the State
The fears arising through this ‘crystal-ball gazing’ are reinforced by studies 
which, through their ‘scientific’ logic, appear entirely coherent. In fact, 
demographers and economists traditionally dominate the study of international 
migration and its causal explanations. Thus some scholars still interpret past and 
present migration patterns as a function of imbalanced labour markets and 
differing rates of population growth.
Within this paradigm, demographic differentials and the economic logic of 
the labour market or some part thereof should explain migratory flows and 
render State intervention difficult, if not impossible. The most conventional 
economic theory regarding immigration assumes that migration is driven by the 
income differential between highly developed and under-developed countries or 
regions of the world. In making the decision of whether or not to leave behind 
their native country, immigrants are assumed to include income differentials in 
their calculations and balance them against the costs of transportation, job 
search, housing, etc. The movement of ‘surplus’ immigrant labour from under­
developed regions to industrialized nations will lower the wages in the 
developed countries by increasing the supply of labour and at the same time 
cause a rise in wages in immigrants’ countries of origin.
Differential population growth comes into play because such growth drives 
down wages in nations of rapid demographic expansion, and thereby increases 
the attraction of industrialized nations with little or negative population growth. 
Through migration, wages would decline in the North and increase in the South, 




























































































self-regulating labour market on a global scale.4 Other macroeconomic 
approaches, such as dual-labour market theory or world-systems theories 
logically assume a hypothesis of massive population flux.5 6Similarly, Alfred 
Sauvy, a noted French demographer, wrote in ‘Richesse et Population ’° that ‘the 
general Laws of migration perfectly explain migratory movements in the last 
few years’. Migration is a phenomenon which functions like ‘communicating 
vessels’.7 In this perspective, the State either completely disappears or is 
considered as an ever weakening impediment to the self-regulation of world 
labour, wage, and population ‘vessels’.
More recently, new analytical frameworks developed by sociologists and 
political scientists have sought to ‘bring the State back in’, if only to ‘execute’ it 
by other means. Despite alternative approaches, these studies have reached a 
similar conclusion: States are incapable of controlling immigration. This 
research trend, which follows the rise of unemployment in Europe, documents 
the attempts by the European industrial States to restrain or to completely halt 
immigration following the rise of unemployment in Europe, concluding that the 
development of free markets and human rights has prevented, or at least 
complicated, governmental policies. In linking the European examples of 
Germany and France to the United States, Jim Hollifield8 argues that a mixture 
of political and economic liberalism explains recent trends in the immigration 
phenomena: the strength of the market explains why States are unable to control 
entries, while political liberalism explains the rise of civil rights granted to 
illegal immigrants and the extreme difficulty involved in deportation even when 
stronger laws allow such procedures. The hypothesis of the ineffectiveness of 
State action in controlling immigration levels has been illustrated through the 
example of the July 1974 French ban on immigration of foreign workers into 
France. According to Hollifield this decision only had a limited effect on 
immigration, since the decrease in immigration of full-time workers was 
compensated for by an increase in immigration by families, refugees, seasonal 
workers, and illegal immigrants.
In a recent book Yasemine Soysal argues that as a result of the extension of 
international and national rights granted to immigrants (whether they be civil or
4 These theories are developed in G. Tapinos, Théorie des Migrations Internationales 
(1974), and are criticized by M. Piore, Birds o f Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial 
Societies (1979).
5 Massey et a i,  'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal’, 19 
Population and Development Review (1993) 431-66.
6 A. Sauvy, Richesse et Population (1943) 173.
7 Hervé le Bras provides a excellent refutation of this approach in ‘Migrations 
Internationales: de la colonisation à l’invasion ou la rhétorique des vases communicants’, 
XVI The Tocqueville Review (1995-1).





























































































social, imposed on nation-states or not) traditional barriers between citizens and 
foreigners are becoming less distinct. The nation-state has to deal with a 
multiplicity of citizenships within its borders, and despite successive attempts to 
keep foreigners out through the passage of new immigration legislation, no 
governments have succeeded in controlling the influx of foreigners.
The combination of these two schools of thought (economic/demographic and 
socio-political) seems all the more attractive, since it reinforces the current 
intellectual trend of documenting the decline of the nation-state. As such, it 
directly contributes to reorganization of the ‘market of fears,’ in disarray since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent reduction of the risk of a Third 
World War against a Communist ‘Bogeyman’. In the current state of affairs, the 
fear of immigration, the ‘Islamic menace’, and environmental issues (more or 
less linked) have become common threats that serve as useful replacements to 
fulfill the role previously occupied by the Soviet empire.
These questions aside, when these different analytical currents are set against 
the realities of the ebbs and flows of migratory movements, it becomes evident 
that they do not stand up to scrutiny based on empirical data.
2. The Failure o f Stateless Theories
(a) Alarmist Forecasts
With respect to the demographic/economic approaches described above, one 
need only compare the immigration ‘forecasts’ immediately before and after the 
collapse of the USSR with the relatively limited number of ex-soviet immigrants 
that actually did leave the country. In 1991, many Western observers were 
deeply concerned about the potential destabilizing effects of a flood of 
immigrants brought about by economic recession and ethnic conflicts in the 
countries of the former Soviet empire. François Heisbourg, director of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London predicted in 1990 that 
‘Economic and even environmental prospects in Eastern Europe will play a key 
role in provoking population movements to the prosperous West’ and that 
‘finally, breakdown of governance in parts of Eastern Europe and the USSR 
would also create massive displacement of minorities within the affected 
areas’.9 10 Jean-Claude Chesnais forecasted in 1991 that the most probable 
scenario after the break-up of the Soviet Union would be the following: ‘If one 
considers the worsening of the economic crisis and the increase in political 
tensions, one can expect in the future more or less uncontrolled waves of
9 Y. Soysal, Limits o f Citizenship, Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe 
(1994) 140-1.





























































































departures’. These predictions were essentially based on two principal factors: 
migration of ethnic minorities of the German, Jewish and Armenian diasporas; 
and migration driven by political instability, ethnic strife and civil wars ‘similar 
to the migration patterns from the South to the North’.11 In addition, Chesnais 
stated that the necessary precondition for these different migratory scenarios to 
take place was the opening of Western borders to Eastern immigration, which, 
in retrospect, never happened.
In response to another fundamental question, classical economic theories of 
migration patterns are also of little help in explaining why, within the European 
Union, Germany (which refuses to acknowledge that it is ‘a country of 
immigration’) has received between 1990 and 1994 eight to ten times more new 
foreign registered immigrants1'  than France, which is seen as the traditional 
country of immigration in Western Europe. Over this period, Germany accepted
1.240.000 asylum seekers while France only received 190 000.13 Germany 
accepted 438,000 asylum seekers in 1992 and about 300,000 in 1993, while 
France, traditionally known as a ‘land of political refuge’ receives only about
30.000 per year.
(b) The Difficult Decision to Emigrate
If the theorists of the ‘communicating vessels’ were right, both the Chinese and 
the Indians would long ago have distributed themselves harmoniously on the 
surface of the globe.
Those who emphasize the strength of attraction of the labour market give 
little consideration to the psychological component of the decision to immigrate. 
Taken together, the 120 million legal immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, 
temporary workers and unauthorized workers living outside their country of 
origin would constitute the world’s tenth largest nation. Despite this fact, the 
most interesting question is not how many, but rather how few, migrants decide 
to move to industrial countries.14
11 Chesnais, ‘Les migrations d ’Europe de l’Est vers l’Europe de l’Ouest: de l’histoire à la 
perspective (1990-2000)’, Report fo r  Council o f Europe, Vienna 24 January 1991, page 
21. For the opposite scenarios, see SOPEMI-OCDE Report 1990.
12 Even though illegal immigration is common in the same economic sectors (agriculture, 
construction, confection, and services) of different countries, were accurate data on 
illegal immigration available, it would probably demonstrate huge differences from one 
country to another.
13 Source: SOPEMI Report Tables A.2 and A.3.
14 Martin, ‘Immigration and Integration: Challenge for the 1990s’, text presented to the 





























































































The decision to migrate is subject to a certain level of inertia.15 To argue 
otherwise is to ignore the emotional and cultural cost of emigrating: leaving 
one’s family, one’s village, and one’s country is never easy. Paradoxically, the 
new vogue of economic theories of immigration which emphasize a 
microeconomic viewpoint (network and institutional theory) fail to account for 
the fact that the vast majority of the world’s population does not even consider 
migration as a possibility.16 A study by Robert Brym and Andrei Degtyarev17 in 
October 1992 based on a telephone poll conducted among 988 residents of 
Moscow showed that 6.7% declared their intention to temporarily or 
permanently emigrate in the near future to one of the developed countries in the 
West. In a previous study in February 1991, Robert Brym evaluated the 
emigration potential of Russia at between 4.75 and 8.90 million, but he 
prudently added that ‘whether or not this potential is realized depends in part on 
Western States’ willingness to accept immigrants’.18
The cost of emigration is further increased when countries of destination 
develop restrictions concerning the entry of immigrants and put legal or 
repressive barriers in place, thereby considerably increasing the risk of any 
attempt to migrate. Again, this perception of changing conditions in the country 
of entry causes a decline in the potential flow of immigrants. Taking the 
example of the United States, Julian L. Simon has emphasized that immigration 
is not an inexorable phenomenon, as it depends more on the objective conditions 
in the receiving country and the subjective perception of these conditions by the 
potential immigrants than on the political and economic environment of the 
countries of origin.19
Without denying the role of some economic factors (salary levels, free market 
orientation, and easier means of communication and transport), the effects of 
these need to be relativized -  for example, infinitely more Africans live in 
conditions of extreme poverty than try to migrate to the North.
15 For example, since 1968, the freedom to migrate within the European Community has 
not led to a significant change in migration patterns. In opposition to this approach see 
the interesting article by Kubat and Hoffmann-Novotny, 'Migrations: vers un nouveau 
paradigme’, XXXIII Revue Internationale des Sciences sociales (1981) 336-59.
16 Massey et al., supra note 6.
17 Brym and Degtyarev, ‘Who Wants to Leave Moscow for the West? Results of an 
October 1992 Survey’, 13 Refuge, (1993) 24-5. See also Helmstadter, ‘The Russian Brain 
Drain in Perspective’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Special Report (18 August 
1992).
18 Brym, ‘The Emigration Potential of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and 
Russia: Recent Survey Results’, 7 International Sociology (1992) 387-95.





























































































It is therefore important to note that during the twentieth century in Europe, 
only major civil or international wars have provoked anything approaching an 
‘invasion’ (defined as a massive and sudden movement of population across 
borders). In France, the end of the Spanish Civil War provoked the arrival, over 
a few weeks in 1939, of 500,000 refugees. Since 1989, only the civil war in the 
former Yugoslavia has been a source of a important migratory movements; 
hundreds of thousands of refugees have left the Balkans, mainly for Germany 
and the other countries of northern Europe. In the future, an escalation of the 
civil war in Algeria or in Eastern Europe could lead to such a situation in the 
developed countries of Western Europe. It is only the fear for one’s life, and the 
resulting hope in the possibility of finding a safe haven, that could lead to such 
massive exodus in the future.
With the exception of these rare cases, this century has witnessed nothing 
resembling such an ‘invasion’. The immigration phenomenon is characterized 
rather by a continuous but limited arrival of immigrants. This does not mean 
that the hypothesis of sudden, massive population shifts should be neglected, as 
massive migration could still occur in several highly volatile regions. However, 
the patterns of immigration over the last few decades demonstrate that when 
taken as a proportion of the population of the developing world, the overall 
number of immigrants in industrialized countries has never reached anything 
close to what could be described as an ‘invasion.’
3. Effectiveness and Differences in Migratory Policies
Furthermore, recent data demonstrate the efficacy of governmental actions. In 
Germany, constitutional reform instituted in 1992 has led to a decrease in the 
number of asylum applicants from 438,200 in 1992 to 127,200 in 1994. In 
France, the number of foreign workers -  the only group effected by the 
immigration ban of 1974 -  entering the country went from 174,000 in 1970 and
132,000 in 1973, to 24,388 in 1993 (of which 15,796 were residents of the 
European Union.) Regarding immigration by the families of foreign workers, in 
1974, the level was approximately 80,000 per year. This dropped to 63,000 in 
1976, and then to 45,000 in 1978-1979. For the past three years, the numbers 
have held steady at about 35,000 each year, with exactly 32,435 in 1993. In the 
1980s, France was confronted with an increase in asylum requests, from 22,000 
in 1983 to 61,000 in 1989. However, since 1989, successive governments have 
passed more restrictive legislation: as a result, between 1989 and 1994, the 
number of asylum requests decreased by 56% (from 60,000 to 26,000).
In Great Britain, the effect of the Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 




























































































1961 to 28,678 in 1963 (the first year of full implementation of the 1962 Act) 
and 5,141 in 1966 (the first year of full implementation of the 1965 Act).20
And yet, a look back to the 1960s reminds us that in Western Europe, for 
example, immigration rates peaked as a result of the overlapping interests of 
industry, and the governments of the labour-exporting and labour-importing 
countries. During the same time period, however, restrictive migration-flow 
policies in nations that were also experiencing rapid economic growth (such as 
Japan), and, inversely, in nations with a high emigration potential (such as the 
Soviet Union), demonstrate the dramatic impact that such policies can have on 
migration. In Europe, when the convergence of interests mentioned above 
ceased to exist, the political decision to stem the flow of foreign labour proved 
to be relatively effective.21
Furthermore, recent legislative and administrative actions cannot logically be 
considered as part of an unstoppable movement towards ever more liberal 
policies. This is particularly apparent in the recent tendencies in American 
politics and policies. Likewise, in Great Britain and France, nationality laws 
have been reformed to further restrict immigration flows. Finally, despite the 
hypothesis of Yasemine Soysal, the nation-state is not disappearing as an 
important legal and effective boundary within the host country. The most recent 
statistics on naturalization demonstrate that the distinction between citizens and 
non-citizens does matter. Otherwise, it would difficult to account for the 
unprecedented number of naturalizations in the United States (one million 
applications for naturalization in 1995) and in France (a record of 92,484 
naturalizations in 1994).
These facts run counter to theories which emphasize the declining ability of 
governments to perform the following tasks: master immigration flows; be 
effective when they pass restrictive legislation; constrain the rights of 
immigrants in national territory; stem the erosion of distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens. As Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller have already 
noted, the different theories of immigration which exclude government policy as 
a central factor in explaining the number of immigrants do not stand up to the 
facts.22
20 See J. Crowley, Immigration, ‘relations raciales' et mobilisations minoritaires au 
Royaume-Uni, La démocratie face à la complexité sociale, PhD dissertation, Institut 
d ’études politiques de Paris (1995) 141.
21 Schain, ‘Policy Effectiveness and the Regulation of Immigration in Europe’, Paper 
prepared fo r  the Annual Meeting o f International Studies Association, 25 February 1995.
22 S. Castles and M. Miller, The Age o f Migration, International Populations Movements in 




























































































Accepting this premise, this study undertakes to explain the divergence in the 
choices and implementation of policy central to the understanding of differences 
in the number of immigrants received by most countries. Despite the 
globalization of the world economy, increased population movements, the 
explosion of telecommunications, and the comparable economic and 
demographic conditions in the countries of Western Europe, rates of 
immigration in both absolute and proportional terms vary greatly from one 
country to another and from one year to the next. Despite great differences in 
the sizes of their populations, Sweden, Belgium and Great Britain each 
welcomed almost the same number of foreign nationals in 1993: between
53.000 and 55.000.23 Germany has admitted the largest number of immigrants 
over the past decade (welcoming 1207,600 persons in 1992 and 986,900 in 1993 
for example), approximately ten times the number of French admissions;
116.000 in 1992 and 99,200 in 1993.24
It is therefore clear that in order to make sense of the differences in the data 
and of comparative migration phenomena, a better understanding of 
immigration control policies is essential. By using a State-oriented approach 
focusing on institutions as well as policy inputs and outcomes, this study will 
seek to explain why different countries which have very similar formal rules in 
their immigration policies have different ‘results’ in terms of policy 
implementation.
23 Trends in International Migrations, SOPEMI-OECD Report, at 205.




























































































B. Nation-States and Immigration Policies: The Three Historical Stages of 
a Convergent Evolution
The point of departure for this analysis is the reality of a world divided into 
around 190 nation-states (186 members of the United Nations and a few others). 
These nation-states are defined by the territory they control and the population 
to whom nationality/citizenship of the State is attributed. Using this definition of 
the organization of the world’s population, each nation-state includes a small 
percentage of the human race and excludes the remaining large majority of the 
world population. This organization, this fundamental split, is at the core of the 
definition of the issue of ‘international migration.’ Therefore, by definition, the 
State defines its contacts with foreign States and foreign individuals through the 
elaboration of rules of access to its territory and to its nationality/citizenship.25
1. The Autonomy o f State Policy
Theoretically, if a State wishes to stop immigration, to deport every immigrant, 
or to block all forms of naturalization, it can do so. In practice, no State has 
gone to such an extreme, but the principal of sovereignty has nonetheless 
brought about the creation of immigration rules and practices of control.
Not only is such control legitimate, but it has always existed, even in the 
nineteenth century United States, during a time in American history when 
contemporary myths would lead one to think the contrary.26 Yet the degree to 
which this control was exercised has varied greatly throughout history. At the 
end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth century, when the 
flow of immigration became massive in immigration-oriented countries such as 
the United States and France, means of control were hotly debated and 
immigration policies developed considerably. However, in these two countries, 
debate has never been centred on the question of total control or the complete 
lack thereof; it has always revolved around the level of control or on the means 
required for implementation of these controls.27 During the peak period of 
immigration mentioned above and until the Second World War, the autonomy 
of the State to determine the level of immigration and the means of control was 
almost complete.
25 On the legal justification of this approach, see R. Plender International Migration Law 
(1972) Chapter 1 and T. Aletnikoff el al. Immigration Process and Policy (3rd ed., 1995) 
Chapter 1, sec A.
26 See Neuman, ‘The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875)’, 93 
Columbia Law Review (1993) 1833.
27 Currently, for example, in the American Congress in 1995-96, the debate rests on 
limiting the number of legal immigrants allowed into the country annually to between 




























































































Before World War 11, when selection of immigrants became an issue in the 
United States and in France because of their massive arrival, the debate in the 
two countries was organized, roughly speaking, around two forms of control: an 
‘egalitarian’ and ‘universalistic’ selection based on individual qualifications 
(physical, mental, moral, and eventually educational, involving the infamous 
literacy test) or a ‘racialist’ selection based on national or racial affiliation. In 
the US, the racialist approach regained strength in the years following the end of 
the Civil War (1870) and officially dominated US policy from the 1920s 
through 1965. Starting in the 1920s, the United States implemented a policy of 
selecting immigrants based on their nationality and their race. The candidate not 
only had to fulfill the condition of being part of a national quota, but also had to 
belong to a race eligible for naturalization. Furthermore, those admitted to the 
United States had to be deemed ‘unlikely to be a public charge’. In the 1930s 
when unemployment figures peaked, these national quotas were never filled, 
despite the needs of hundreds of thousands of European refugees fleeing Nazi 
oppression.28 In France, the racialist approach was never publicly chosen. But, 
following the First World War, it was implemented in practice. During the 
1920s, France deported ‘undesirable’ colonial soldiers and workers, imported 
during the war, back to their colonies of origin. For racial reasons, the French 
authorities did not want these foreigners to settle in the metropolitan area. At the 
end of the 1930s, a climate of economic crisis was compounded by the threat of 
war with Germany and the impending arrival of refugees that would surely 
result, lead France to the verge of adopting national and racial quota policy 
similar to that used in the US. In fact, even after the war, the government, with 
the approval of Charles de Gaulle, considered implementing such a policy. 
However, the French civil service opposed such a project, arguing that an 
immigration policy based on a hierarchy of racial or national origins would too 
closely resemble Nazi ideology. As such, any legislation based on the explicit 
mention of national criteria as a basis for the selection of immigrants was 
stigmatized.29
This stigmatization of any forms of ‘racial science’ due to its similarity to 
Nazi ideology had a huge effect on the extension of democratic norms through 
several countries. Immigrant selection or selective procedures for naturalization 
based on racial criteria or national origins were progressively eliminated from 
legislation in the United States and in France, with a full repeal of national 
quotas in the United States in 1965. When other European countries, followed 
by Japan, became countries of immigration, they were forced to join this
28 R. Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952 (1957).
29 See Weil, ‘Racisme el discriminations dans la politique française de l’immigration: 1938- 




























































































normative constraint and to formally apply the rule of non-rejection of 
immigrants based on national or racial origins.
2. The Rise o f Nonnative Constraints on Immigration Laws
The condemnation of a racialist approach as a means of selection at ports of 
entry had the consequence of creating alternative legal categories: refugees, 
families of immigrants, and two different kinds of worker: skilled workers and 
temporary workers. The world’s woefully inadequate response to Nazi 
persecution prior to and during the course of World War 11 provoked the 
development of a new international humanitarian normative structure10 which 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s had another consequence: that of placing limits 
on the type of restrictive control policies which could be legitimately 
implemented by democratic governments. As Peter Schuck has written, in the 
case of the United States the rise of these normative constraints produced a 
‘transformation of immigration law’.11
(a) A right of Access
Apart from the end of a racialist approach to immigration selection, the first 
factor constraining governments in their immigration policy is the extension of 
rights guaranteed by international conventions or internal laws, particularly 
those concerning special rights guaranteed on national territory, or in some 
cases access to it, given to refugees, asylum seekers and families of foreign 
residents.
i) The Refugees and Asylum Seekers:
All the European States nowadays practice territorial asylum and are party to the 
1951 Geneva UN Convention and the New York 1967 UN protocol relating to 
the status of refugees. Territorial asylum and refugee status are two different 
legal situations with different histories.
Territorial asylum is a unilateral protection given by a State to a foreigner or a 
Stateless person. Historically related to an ancient religious and political 
tradition in Classical Greece, asylum developed in the Christian tradition as a 
religious obligation. It has progressively been transferred and transformed with 
the emergence of modem European States into a status provided by kings and 
kingdoms as an act of sovereignty. Its political dimension was only theorized in 
the eighteenth century by philosophers such as Voltaire and theorists of 
international law such as Vattel or Beccaria. At the end of the same century, the 301
30 Martin, ‘Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia’, 138 
University o f Pennsylvania Law Review (1990) 254.





























































































American and the French Revolutions permitted the implementation of asylum 
on a large scale by two means: the two new Republics proclaimed themselves to 
be lands of asylum for persecuted people, and thus became so; but their 
emergence also provoked emigration of refugees from America and France, 
leading to the arrival of tens of thousands of people in the English Territories 
and the German States. During the first part of the nineteenth century, the 
practice of territorial/political asylum was extended to all modem States of the 
Western world32 and still remains to this day a sovereign power of ever)' State.
The creation of an individual international status for the ‘refugee’ is the 
product of a complex process resulting from the upheavals of the twentieth 
century. In the aftermath of World War I, the flow of refugees, which previously 
had tended to be relatively limited, quickly became massive. Because of this 
change, a definition and a status assigned to refugees took shape.33 The Russian 
October Revolution provoked the departure of almost one and half million 
persons, who, by the decree of 15 December 1921, were often deprived of their 
Russian citizenship. The Council of the League of Nations established the 
Office of High Commissioner for Refugees with the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen 
at its head. So to ensure the juridical protection lost by their ‘denaturalization’, 
international travel documents were provided to Russian refugees living outside 
the territory of the Soviet Union on 5 July 1922. These ‘Nansen passports’ were 
recognized by 54 countries and permitted the refugee to travel across these 
countries from the country of first welcome. On 31 May 1924 the applicability 
of Nansen identity certificates was extended to Armenian refugees, and on 30 
June 1928, 155,000 refugees of seven other different origins and on 26 October 
1933, the Council of the League of Nations created the High Commissioner for 
refugees coming from Germany.
On 28 October 1933 an international conference adopted the first Geneva 
Convention on the International Status of the Refugee, which ratified the former 
definition given to Russian and Armenian refugees: a person who no longer 
enjoys the protection of the Soviet or the Turkish Republics and who has not 
acquired other nationality. The signatory States (who were not very numerous at 
first; 8 in all) agreed to respect important rights for refugees: ‘non-refoulement’, 
access to the labour market, education, social security, etc.
The next step in defining refugees was to extend the status to persons 
persecuted even if they had not lost their nationality of origin -  an extension
32 On the definition and history of refugee and asylum statutes, see F. Crépeau, Droit 
d'asile -  De l ’hospitalité aux contrôles migratoires, (1995), particularly the first section.





























































































from a juridical need for protection to a political one.34 This extensive definition 
was given to the refugees from the Saar Territory (24 May 1935), to German 
refugees (4 July 1936) and to refugees from the Sudetenland (17 January 1939). 
The 10 February 1938 Convention concerning the status of refugees coming 
from Germany concerned ‘persons possessing or having possessed German 
nationality and not possessing any other nationality, who are proved not to 
enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the Government of the Reich’.35 When, 
after the Anschluss, the Evian Conference (6-15 July 1938) on the situation of 
the Jewish population in territories under the domination of the Nazi regime was 
held at the initiative of President Franklin Roosevelt, a third definition emerged, 
different in its essence and at the same time more restrictive and more extensive 
in its grounds of protection.
This third definition by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees 
provided the first individualized definition of the refugee.36 The latter was no 
longer defined by his origin but by his individual situation: ‘a person who has 
not already left his country of origin (Germany including Austria) but who must 
emigrate on account of their political opinions, religious beliefs, and racial 
origin’. This definitional transfer from a group to an individual could have 
involved a restriction in the scope of protection, but for the first time, the 
definition concerned persons still in their country of origin and would have the 
effect of greatly enlarging the number of persons eligible for refugee status. This 
approach benefited the Spanish republicans, for example. After the war, the 
General Assembly of United Nations created the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) in December 1946 in an effort to unify juridically, if not 
practically, the status of displaced persons and refugees since the First World 
War. The assistance of the IRO was given to persons who could not be 
repatriated or those who ‘in complete freedom and after receiving full 
knowledge of the facts... expressed valid objections to returning to [their 
countries of origin]’. This task was then transferred to the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) just before the signature of 
the Geneva Convention on 28 July 1951.
In the negotiations of the convention which took place in Geneva (2-25 July 
1951), three main questions were discussed:
1) What would be the definition chosen and how would the process of 
recognition be constituted?
34 Hathaway, ibid, to whom I owe this analytic of a three stage evolution, qualified the 
political stage as ‘social’.
35 Hathaway, ibid, at 364.




























































































2) Would the convention include an automatic right of admission of a potential 
refugee on the territory of a signatory State?
3) Would it include criteria based on origins or on events justifying refugee 
status?
The definition of a refugee adopted at the convention confirmed the move 
towards individualization. Article 1 of the Convention defines a refugee as a 
person who is unwilling or unable to return to his or her country ‘owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.
But the agreement can be seen as a defeat for international recognition of 
individuals in favour of the sovereignty of the nation-state. A restrictive 
compromise based on the largest common denominator preserved of the 
sovereignty of each nation-state.
Unlike the 1938 definition, the 1951 definition of a refugee no longer 
mentions ‘persons who have not already left their country of origin’. So as to 
enforce national sovereignty, the right of automatic admission, the possibility to 
impose on a signatory State the entrance on its territory of a potential refugee 
(as argued by France against the conception defended by the United States and 
Great Britain) was not accepted.37 As long as admission to national territory 
remains in the realm of competence of each State, the State will continue to 
define the right of territorial asylum using its own criteria, following its own 
domestic procedure.38
At the demand of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the backing 
of the United States, the Convention permitted each signatory State not only to 
implement the general time limit laid down by the convention (which specified 
that a person could only acquire refugee status ‘as a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951’) but also to impose a territorial limit by inserting after 
the word ‘events’ the optional words ‘occurring in Europe’ prior to the critical 
date.39
The Convention did not guarantee that an applicant would be granted asylum 
if he deserved it: it simply stipulated that he would not be returned ‘to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened’ (Article 
33). Nor did it recognize the automatic right to the highest level of social and 
civil rights (either in the form of the same treatment as citizens of the country of
37 C. Norek and F. Doumic-Doublet, Le Droit d'Asile en France (1989) 35.
38 G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (1983).





























































































residence or the most favourable treatment accorded to those citizens of a 
foreign country residing in the host country). Later, the creation of new nation­
states out of former colonies provided the grounds for the extension of the 
convention beyond Europe to all countries without limitation of date (codified in 
the 1967 Protocol of New York).
Although all the countries involved in this study now recognize and claim to 
obey the convention, the modes of recognition occurred differently in each one.
- In France, the differentiation between political refugees and other types of 
immigrants is not new. France received the largest number of refugees in 
Europe in the period between the two World Wars, even when, for economic 
reasons, the immigration of foreign workers was prohibited. In 1938, for 
example, restrictions on immigration were reinforced, but at the same time the 
right of asylum and refugee status were formally guaranteed.40 After the Second 
World War, France ratified the Geneva Convention including the restrictive 
option clause which was not repealed until 1971.41 The French Office for the 
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, created in 1952, is in charge of the 
recognition of refugee status. The Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution 
specifies that ‘any person persecuted on account of his actions in favour of 
Liberty has a right to asylum within the territories of the Republic.’ 
Additionally, at the discretion of the State, de facto refugee status and 
permission to remain on French territory can be provided to refugees who lack 
individual proof of well-founded fear of persecution necessary to claim Geneva 
status.
- Despite its liberal reputation and the exemption given to political and religious 
refugees from the main requirements of the Alien’s Act of 1905,4: the United 
Kingdom did not welcome numerous refugees after the First World War. 
Accordingly to Michael M. Marrus,43 only about 15,000 Russians and 1,000 
Armenians migrated to Great Britain. ‘In contrast to France, British officials had 
no pretense about a long-standing policy of asylum’.44 Therefore, it was only in 
reaction to the refugee crisis of 1938 as well as in compensation for the
10 See Weil, ‘La politique d'immigration de la France et des Etats-Unis à l’égard des 
réfugiés d ’Europe Centrale à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale’, Les Cahiers de la 
Shoah'(1995-2)51-84.
41 Decree n°71-289 of 9 April 1971 publishing the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees (606 UNTS 267). On the French Policy towards refugees after World War II 
see, Cohen, ’Insertion et Transit: les réfugiés juifs de l’après-guerre 1945-1948', Liana 
Levi (ed ), Archives Juives, 29/1, (1er sem. 1996) 92-101.
42 R. Plender, supra note 26, at 231-2. The distinction was present in the 1905 Act, but had 
disappeared in the alien legislation of 1914-1919.
43 M. Marrus, The Unwanted, European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (1985) 149-54.




























































































restrictionist policy towards Jews who wanted to settle in Palestine that Great- 
Britain cautiously opened its doors.45 At the end of 1939 about 50,000 refugees 
from the Reich and 6,000 from Czechoslovakia had received asylum on the 
territory of the United Kingdom, and London was the seat of 1938 ICR. Since 
that moment, Great Britain has involved itself in international action for 
refugees and participated actively in the elaboration of the Geneva Convention. 
Great Britain implemented the convention formally, choosing its universal 
option ( ‘in Europe and elsewhere’) as a nod towards liberalism.
- Founded in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany far surpasses the 
restrictions of the Geneva convention which it signed in 1951. The inclusion of 
a provision related to asylum in the 1949 Basic Law was seen by its drafters as 
an important commitment to human rights in the aftermath of the war, 
symbolizing the rejection not only of national socialism but also responding to 
political persecution in Eastern Europe.46 Article 16 paragraph 2, sentence 2 of 
the German Constitution provides that ‘the politically persecuted shall enjoy 
asylum’. Three kinds of applicants, and therefore refugees, are recognized in the 
German system:47 ‘Article 16’ refugees, Geneva convention refugees, and the de 
facto refugees who lack individual proof of a well-founded fear of persecution 
needed to obtain Geneva status but who are nonetheless permitted to remain on 
humanitarian grounds, under the implicit rule of ‘non-refoulement’.
45 C. Holmes, John Bull's Island, Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (1988) 140- 
8.
46 Kanstroom, ‘Wer Sind Wir Wieder? Laws of Asylum, Immigration, and Citizenship in 
the Struggle for the Soul of the New Germany’, 18 The Yale Journal o f International 
Law (???) 194.
47 See Neuman, ‘Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the German 





























































































A religious sacrament before becoming a domestic civil right, a normal family 
life was progressively guaranteed by international conventions and national 
courts. The first stage of international recognition48 of a right to live with one’s 
family was the recognition of the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 17 December 1948, stipulating that any human being can 
marry and have a family, considered as the ‘natural and fundamental element of 
the society.’ The General Assembly of the United Nations ratified two pacts on 
16 December 1966, relating to the implementation of the principles in the 
Declaration of 1948. In Europe, the European Convention for the safeguard of 
human rights signed in 1950 guarantees the right for any human being living on 
the territory of a member State the right to a normal family life and the freedom 
of marriage.
Progressively British, French and Germans courts introduced these rights in 
their internal jurisprudence. The French Conseil d'Etat recognized it in a GIST1 
decision of 1978. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has extended the 
protection of the family provided for by Article 6 of the Basic Law49 to 
immigrants, as for example in 1987.50 In France, as in Germany, alien residents 
who wish to be joined by their family members must satisfy the following three 
requirements: a) legal residence b) sufficient living space c) means of financial 
support.
(b)The Development of the Rule of Law on the Territory of Immigration 
Countries
i) The Protection of Illegals
In all countries of Europe the last two decades have been marked by a parallel, 
yet contradictory evolution. As administrators and legislators became 
increasingly concerned with illegal immigration, national courts extended the 
protection of illegals, thereby constraining public action. Peter Schuck analyzes 
this evolution as the unfolding of ‘communitarian’ principles grounded in the 
perception that individuals, societies and nations are bound to each other by 
‘pervasive interdependencies ... (implying) certain moral and legal 
consequences’51 towards ‘all individuals who manage to reach America’s 
shores, even to strangers whom it has never undertaken, and has no wish to
48 See, ‘La famille au ban de l’Europe’, 25 Plein Droit (1994).
49 Para. 1: Marriage and family shall enjoy the special protection of the state. Para. 2: The 
care and upbringing of children are a natural right of, and a duty primarily incumbent on, 
the parents.
50 Motomura, ‘The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap to the Ruritanian Lawmaker’, 43 
AJCL(\995) 517.




























































































protect’.52 In Europe, the same phenomenon can be interpreted as a reaction to 
the scars left by the events of World War II.
ii) A Quasi-Ban on Deportation of Legal Residents 
Finally, a de facto right has emerged in the 1970s. The democratic countries 
have learned that even if legal selection not based on racial or national criteria at 
entry is legitimate, the categorization of immigrants into various groups 
(temporary, permanent, refugee, guest workers etc.) has had little impact on the 
actual duration of the stay. Before the Second World War, legal immigrants 
were often deported back to their countries or territories of origin at the 
expiration of their residence permit when economic downturns created 
competition for jobs between nationals and foreigners. This was the case in 
France for numerous Poles in 1934-35 during the peak years of the economic 
depression. These policies have progressively become illegitimate since World 
War II, even if the learning process regarding this international norm has 
proceeded at different rates from one country to the next.
In the United States, where legal immigration traditionally leads to 
citizenship, therefore forced deportation of legal immigrants for economic 
reasons has never been considered. This type of solution can be envisaged, 
however, by a country which has welcomed ‘workers on a temporary basis’.
In France, this obligation came from the ethical and practical impossibility of 
repatriating ‘undesirable’ foreign workers by force. For racialist reasons. 
President Valery Giscard d’Estaing attempted a forced repatriation of the 
majority of legal North African immigrants, especially Algerians, between 1978 
and 1980.53 However, due to a strong reaction from the political Left, the labour 
unions, the RPR, and the CDS, the initiative failed. Giscard d’Estaing’s idea of 
repatriation also provoked a vivid reaction from the French Administrative 
Supreme Court (the Conseil d'Etat). In its decision, the Court, while primarily 
referring to republican values and constitutional principals, also invoked the 
damaging effects of such a policy for France’s image abroad. The force of this 
rebuttal caused the government to back down. In June 1984, the French 
Parliament passed an Act which eventually guaranteed permanent residence for 
all foreign citizens living in France, regardless of their origin.
In Great Britain, the 1948 law granted not only the right of permanent 
residence but also full citizenship to many undesirable citizens of the New 
Commonwealth as soon as they set foot on British soil. It is perhaps due to this
52 Ibid, at 4.




























































































fact that Great Britain restricted immigration from 1962 onwards, much earlier 
than other European countries.
In Germany the result was similar, but the process did not occur in the same 
manner. In Germany, the courts were at the centre of a policy revolution which 
has not been readily admitted in official discourses. Officially, the Federal 
Republic of Germany argued that it was not a country of immigration even if it 
had organized and recruited a large number of foreign workers since the end of 
the 1950s who were needed to operate the nation’s rapidly expanding economic 
infrastructure. These immigrants were officially considered as temporary 
workers who would return to their countries of origin after several years of work 
in Germany. Conversely, the Federal Republic favoured the return to the 
‘mother nation’ of those populations having German ancestors or, in other 
words, ‘German blood’, who lived in the GDR or other regions in Eastern 
Europe. These immigrants were easily and automatically conferred German 
nationality, in conformity with the conception, still dominant at the time, that 
the nation was defined by the ethnic origins of the German people, regardless of 
their geographic distribution throughout Eastern and Central Europe.
In 1970,54 a Bavarian administrative court ruled that a foreign worker’s 
sojourn of more than five years was sufficient grounds ‘to deny further 
residency (authorization), as each extended residency (authorization) would tend 
towards settlement, which ordinarily runs counter to State interests because the 
Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration.’ This decision 
was overruled at the federal level and in 1972 the federal government stated that 
‘the limitation of the duration of the stay of foreign employees will not be 
regulated through repressive measures under the law related to foreigners.’ The 
German Constitutional Court based its judgment on the Preamble of the Basic 
Law which recognizes and protects fundamental human rights as well as 
economic and social welfare rights. The Constitutional Court drew on the Basic 
Law and its jurisprudence, considered as a ‘spiritual-moral confrontation with 
the previous system of National-Socialism’,55 to extend the principal of the 
basic rights and protections of the Jedermann Grundrechte, not only to German 
citizens but also to aliens living in Germany. In 1978, the Court recognized that 
‘an alien acquires a constitutionally protected reliance interest to remain in 
Germany as a result of prior routine renewals of his residence permit and his
54 Miller, ‘Policy Ad-Hocracy: The Paucity of Coordinated Perspectives and Policies’, 
Annals, AAPSS, 485, (May 1986) 71 quoting H. Reister, Auslanderbeschaftigung und 
Auslanderpolitik in der Bimdesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin, Fachhochschule fur 
Verwaltung und Rechtspflege, monograph n°38.




























































































integration into German Society’.56 After the failure of the voluntary return 
policy in 1983-1984, this legal right became a massive sociological reality.
This moral and legal constraint on the forced departure of legal and illegal 
immigrants provided by the international democratic community contrasts 
sharply with the relative liberty with which non-democratic States, which are 
not as responsive to the moral constraints imposed by the international 
community, are still deporting legal foreign workers (i.e. Saudi Arabia in 1991, 
Iraq in 1990, Libya in 1984, and Nigeria in 1983, among others).
The fact that host democratic nations are more or less forced to accept 
‘undesirable’ settlers as permanent immigrants (Turks in Germany, Koreans in 
Japan, immigrants from former colonies in Great Britain and in France), led 
many specialists to claim that immigration policies lose their meaning.57 Such 
assumptions were based on a categorization of different types of immigration: 
economic/demographic or political -  each category corresponding to an implicit 
duration of residency. As such, economic migration was often considered as 
temporary, lasting only as long as there was a labour shortage in the host 
country; political migration was linked to the risk of persecution in the nation of 
origin; and only demographic immigration was by definition permanent. This 
approach is no longer valid in the current state of affairs, nor is an opposite one 
which would echo the following statement: ‘The major difference between 
refugees and other migrants is that refugees appear to see their immigration 
from the very start as permanent’.58
3. The Third Stage o f the Immigration Policies: Multiple State Responses to 
Normative Constraints
Democratic States have learned that the immigrant’s status vis-à-vis the host 
nation upon his arrival has little real effect on the actual duration of stay. Today, 
any foreigner authorized for legal residence has to be considered by the State as 
a potential permanent immigrant. This is not to say that all immigrants who 
enter will stay indefinitely, since every year there are a significant number of 
immigrants who spontaneously return to their country of origin -  and who are 
often not counted by official statistics. In any case, the weak link between an 
immigrant’s status and the length of stay has had the important consequence of
50 Ibid, al 171. It is the judgment of 26 September 1978, 49 BVerfGE 168. See also the 
judgment of 10 May 1988, 78 BVerfGE 179, 196-7.
57 For exemple P. George, Les migrations internationales (1974).




























































































demonstrating that policy measures that provide for temporary residence permits 
are largely inefficient, if not counter-productive.59
As a result of the learning curve concerning the entry and the prolonged 
settlement of foreigners, host countries have progressively adapted their 
policies. Formally, three categories of immigrants are authorized to enter all of 
the countries involved in this study with relative ease: 1) foreign-bom spouses 
of citizens, 2) political refugees, and 3) families of foreign residents. A fourth 
group, skilled workers, are still often encouraged. However, over the past 
decade or so, as governments have been submitted to increasing political 
pressure to stop immigration, a policy mobilization, often highly politicized, has 
led to the development of new means of restrictive action within the different 
State agencies. Nonetheless, the time lag between the surprise to policy-makers 
that has resulted from the transformation of jurisprudence in immigration law 
and the transformation of policies which are its consequences, has been 
significant. In order to reduce this gap before new policies were implemented, 
some regularization or legalization of illegals was often undertaken so as to start 
with a ‘clean slate’ (as was the case in France in 1981 and in Spain and Italy 
between 1985 and 1991).60
The new immigration policies are still in the course of being implemented. 
However, legislation from this more recent period demonstrates a continuing 
process of State adaptation to immigration phenomena and the evolution of 
jurisprudence. These new policies all include employer sanctions, legal 
deterrence, international cooperation, and an increase in funding for the State 
agencies that implement immigration policy. However, as argued above, the 
convergence of national policies due to international constraints or policy 
transformations has resulted in very different policy outcomes in different 
countries. These differences are due to the divergent role of several factors in 
the environment of immigration policy as well as different choices of policy 
tools.
59 This learning curve has not yet resulted in the harmonization of definitions. Although the 
European States have essentially eliminated the distinction between temporary workers 
and permanent workers, the US still considers temporary workers to be non-immigrants. 
Of 21 million such non-immigrants admitted to the US in 1993, 17 million were tourists, 
3 million were business visitors, and 1 million from miscellaneous groups, including 
165,000 temporary foreign workers, 257,000 foreign students etc. The last category, 
foreign students, holds particular promise for those wishing to become permanent 
settlers. Martin and Midgley, ‘Immigration to the United States: Journey to an Uncertain 
Destination’, 49 Population Bulletin (1994) 6-7.
60 In France 132,000 illegals were regularized. Regularizations that occured in Spain in 
1985-1986 and 1991 involved respectively 44,000 and 105,000 persons; in Italy in 





























































































C. Geopolitics and Domestic Politics: The Factors of Differentiation of 
Policy Outcomes
The factors resulting in differences in the implementation of immigration policy 
can be divided into two categories: 1) the geopolitical context of immigration; 
2) immigration politics and the policy process.
1. The Geopolitical Context o f Immigration
When put into practice in different countries, policies have had to take into 
account:
- different geographical situations;
- differing political cultures;
- specific historical interactions;
- international and diplomatic interest;
(a) The Geographical Situation
Natural or physical borders are much easier to control than land or political 
borders. It is therefore easier for Island nations such as Japan or Great Britain to 
control immigration than it is for Germany, and to certain extent, France or the 
United States.
(b) Some Examples of Cultural Constraints
- The Market, the State and Society
Control of immigration involves an often fragmented police and justice 
administration, in addition to a number of economic actors (employers, unions, 
etc.). The differences in the levels of interaction and control between the State, 
the market, and the society as well as the values shared by the society can have 
important effects on the implementation of immigration policy.
- General attitudes towards immigration
A nation’s general attitude towards immigrants depends largely on the role 
which immigration played in the founding and the development of the society: 
one can differentiate between countries of immigrants like the United States, 
where even in periods of restrictive policy, immigration is still perceived as 
constituting the initial building blocks of the society; countries of immigration 
like France, where the incorporation of immigrants is reluctantly perceived as a 
necessity or a burden; or more recent immigration countries like Germany or 
Japan which still refuse to admit that they have become countries of 
immigration and which see the settlement of immigrants as a legal constraint. 
The apparent convergence of the rules and practices governing migration-flow 
policy conceals widely diverging cultural perceptions of immigration that have 




























































































- Last but not least, some constitutional and ethical values can have effects on 
the organization of immigration policy, such as the right of the police to control 
identity through photo identification papers.61 The use of such identity controls 
as a means to control immigration is largely dependent on political culture: for 
example, in continental Europe, identity control is legitimate, while this is far 
from being the case in Great Britain, where the ideal of individual freedom is 
more easily respected in part due to the ease with which the borders of an island 
nation can be controlled.
(c) History
Historical attitudes of countries towards refugees or immigrants (foreign or 
colonial) can have a significant influence on the types of policies that can be 
considered as legitimate.
For similar reasons, the history of the relationship between the host country 
and the countries of origin can also strongly affect immigration policy. One can 
cite as examples in Europe the relations of Germany with political refugees, and 
with Turkey and Turks, France with Algeria and Algerians.
The reactions of France and Germany to the economic crisis following the 
first oil shock in 1973 is an interesting case. Despite differing historical 
traditions concerning immigration, reactions to the crisis by the French and 
German governments with regard to their immigrant policies differed more than 
their historical traditions would have led one to believe. Among European 
countries, France has historically had one of the most liberal immigration 
policies. At the end of the nineteenth century, France implicitly favoured 
immigration, a de facto policy stand that was later made permanent through the 
decrees of 1945. At the root of this desire -  unique in Europe -  to favour the 
permanent settlement of foreign families and the acquisition of French 
nationality are, first, economic reasons, and more importantly, the concerns 
brought about by France’s weak demographic growth. However, between 1978 
and 1980, President Giscard d’Estaing attempted to organize the forced return of 
several hundred thousand resident immigrants to their countries of origin, in 
particular the Algerians. He therefore took measures which no other European 
country considered. His initiative failed, but what is interesting is that he tried in 
the first place. It was paradoxically France’s historical image as the birthplace of 
human rights which made it at all possible to envisage such a step.62
Germany halted all new arrivals of guest workers in November 1973. With 
the passing of the years, it became clear that the economic crisis and a steadily
61 D. Papademetriou and K. Hamilton, Managing Uncertainty: Regulating Immigration 
Flows in Advanced Industrial Countries, A Camegie Endowment Book (1995), at 14.




























































































increasing unemployment rate was creating a contradiction between the original 
conception of immigrants as a simple labour force and the permanent settlement 
of this ‘surplus’ population. Given the explicitly temporary statute of immigrant 
workers, one would have expected the implementation of an active policy of the 
return of its guest workers to their countries of origin. But this is forgetting that 
the F.R.G. is, since 1945, a State which is limited, more than any other, by 
moral constraints concerning civil and human rights. Ethically, it was 
impossible to organize the forced repatriation of foreigners. Attempts have been 
made more recently to strike a deal with the countries of origin by offering 
substantial financial aid in return for the return of unwanted immigrants. This 
has been rather unproductive, as the measures have concerned only those who 
already had the intention of returning, and the operation has proved to be a 
heavy burden on public expenditures.
(d) Immigration and International Relations
By definition, immigration policies are related to foreign policy. Until their 
naturalization, immigrants remain citizens of foreign countries. Often migrants 
have come from countries with which the welcoming country has intensive 
relations: common borders, historical allies or enemies, former colonies. Often 
immigration issues are included in a large set of bilateral issues which impose 
bargaining and/or are treated in a multilateral system which imposes norms and 
values. Depending on the state of diplomatic relations and on the relative 
strength of the sending and receiving countries, the margins of action for the 
host country vary.
2. Immigration Politics and the Policy Process
The other set of constraints concern:
a) the effect of politicization on the policy-making process;
b) the process of agenda building;
c) administrative and legal traditions; structures and systems of resource 
allocation between government agencies.
These constraints will be rapidly defined here and developed in the national 
examples in the following section where their articulation is more significant.63
(a) Politicization and Policy-making
Immigration involves national identity and human rights. Thus, by definition it 
is an issue lending itself to politicization in one form or another. Whether or not 
immigration becomes a political issue depends in large part on the organization 
of the political system, the specific modes of agenda building as well as the 
context of partisan competition.




























































































(b) The Process of Agenda Building
Political inertia is largely dependent on the procedures for decision-making and 
execution. For example, in France or in Great Britain where the dependence of 
the Parliament on government and party discipline is high, it is very easy for the 
government to pass a law. For example. Five laws on immigration, including a 
Constitutional reform, were passed in France in 1995. In the United States, 
however, with a tradition of checks and balances, the rivalry between the White 
House and the Congress considerably slows the legislative process and requires 
frequent compromises. The 1986 immigration legislation passed after more than 
five years of discussion and negotiation, and the 1990 bill took nearly four years 
to be passed.64
Therefore, there is a variable time lag from one polity to another between the 
emergence of the problem on the political agenda, the development of a possible 
solution, and the implementation of that solution. The content of the agenda also 
depends in large part on the way in which a ‘problem’ emerges and is 
articulated: in Europe, proposals are determined almost solely at the political or 
administrative level, while in the United States, a multitude of private interest 
groups (representing ethnic, religious, humanitarian or professional groups) as 
well as academics and other experts intervene to influence the content of a 
certain regulation or piece of legislation.
When reforms imply the modification of the Constitution, the process 
becomes even more complicated and prolonged. Again, in France, it is relatively 
easy to revise French nationality law, while it is considerably more difficult in 
Germany.
(c) The Method of Policy Implementation
This is also vital: does implementation depend on fragmented anchor competing 
administrative agencies or unified ones? On local or on national agencies?
In Germany, naturalization and the settlement of asylum seekers are 
organized at the level of the Lander, whereas in France such actions are still 
centralized. Information on who is implementing a policy can have profound 
effects on the results of that policy as well as the policy choices involved in 
achieving those results.65
Lastly, the capacity of a State to act rapidly also depends on the degree of 
independence of national or constitutional courts which can block legislation.
64 Ibid, at 15-19.
65 Body-Gendrot and Schain, in D. Horowitz and G. Noiriel (eds), Immigrants in Two 




























































































D. The Interplay of Factors Determining Policy Illustrated by Case Studies
The combination of the different factors described above can often help to 
explain specific choices in policy development, their means of implementation, 
and finally, their outcomes. This inter-relation will be illustrated in the study of 
Germany, Great-Britain, France, as well as the policy within the European 
Union as an whole, especially since the Schengen agreement of 1985.
1. Germany
Beyond the constraints we have already described which have forced Germany 
to accept the permanent settlement of temporary workers, the German Basic 
Law and the geographical situation of Germany have transformed it into the 
country receiving the greatest number of immigrants in Europe.
But even if German authorities are still publicly declaring that Germany is not 
a country of immigration, in practice they are creating a highly rational 
immigration policy.
Through the instrumentalization of the European Union in German politics, 
the conservative coalition succeeded in adopting a constitutional amendment 
restricting an extremely liberal asylum law, thereby aligning German laws with 
the laws and practices in other European countries and subsequently causing a 
significant decrease in the number of demands for asylum. But this reform of 
asylum laws, so as to limit fraudulent requests, did not prevent Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl from recently reaffirming Germany’s moral responsibility to 
accept refugees from the war-tom territories of ex-Yugoslavia.
In order to prevent illegal immigration from their eastern neighbours, 
Germany has developed agreements with them, making each country 
responsible for stemming the flow of illegal aliens from third countries through 
their own country.
In addition, the German government has implemented bilateral accords on the 
entry of seasonal, border, or trainee labour. To combat illegal employment in the 
sectors where the supply of workers in its own national market is insufficient, 
Germany recently created four kinds of contracts that regulate the hiring of 
seasonal or temporary foreign workers, as agreed in accords signed most often 
with the nations of central and eastern Europe. The four categories of contracts 
are 1) Czech, Slovak, or Polish Grenzarbeitnehmer (border dwellers) who can 
work every day in a zone stretching 50 kilometers to the west of the border, on 
the condition that they return home every night or that they only work on 




























































































and learn a trade for eighteen months in Germany; 3) Approximately 200,000 
seasonal workers (Saisonarbeitnehmer) work for a maximum of three months; 
and lastly, 4) the status of Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer allows foreign companies 
to meet honour contracts in Germany by importing their own workers.66 Such 
short-term regional migrations meet the common needs of the nations as well as 
the economic actors involved.
2. Great Britain
In the aftermath of the Second World war, British authorities recognized that the 
reconstruction of the British economy would require an injection of foreign 
labour.67 The 1949 Royal Commission on Population stated that immigration 
would be welcome ‘without reserve’ if ‘the migrants were of good human stock 
and were not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the 
host population and becoming merged into it’.68 The British government 
therefore tried mainly to attract Poles, but also the so-called displaced persons 
from Eastern Europe or Spain, and single women of Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Estonian, Austrian or German nationality. In addition, many Italians of both 
genders, mainly from Southern Italy, came to Great Britain until the middle of 
the 1950s. Finally, the traditional Irish immigration did not stop -  on the 
contrary. But all together this ‘racially desirable’ immigration was of a limited 
extent and not sufficient to provide the necessary manpower for the labour 
market.
It was the awaited massive arrival of a new immigration coming from the so- 
called New Commonwealth which changed the dimensions of the problem. 
Chinese immigrants coming for example from Hong Kong, Black people 
coming partly from Africa but mainly from the Caribbean. After the symbolic 
arrival from Kingston, Jamaica of a boat with 492 passengers aboard in June 
1948, immigration from the West Indies was boosted by the state of the labour 
market in Great Britain and the curtailment of immigration into the US imposed 
by the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. Last but not least, immigration from the 
Indian subcontinent started at end of the 1940s and developed in the 1950s, 
including a large contingent from Pakistan.
This New Commonwealth immigration was facilitated by the content of the 
British Nationality Act which gave the citizens of the New Commonwealth
66 K. Groenendijk and R. Hampsink, Temporary Employment o f Migrants in Europe 
(1994). H. Werner, Agreement Providing fo r  Short-term Migration fo r  Employment and 
Training Purposes. Strasbourg, Conseil de 1’Europe, Select Committee of Experts on 
Short-term Migration (1994).
67 C. Holmes supra note 46, in particular Chapter V.




























































































countries the right to freely enter British territory and therefore to become 
British citizens.
The backlash against the free entrance of the ‘racially undesirable’ 
immigration started at the end of the 1940s with incidents involving opposing 
groups of white and black people which attracted the attention of the Labour 
government. From 1948 until 1962, when the Commonwealth Act was passed, 
the ‘problem’ never really left the governmental agenda. The passing of a 
restrictive immigration law was facilitated by the dramatic and violent 
confrontations occurring in August 1958 in Nottingham69 as well as by the fact 
that contrary to colonial immigration to France in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
Turkish immigration in Germany which was considered to be temporary. 
Commonwealth immigrants were allowed to permanently reside on the territory 
of the United Kingdom and become citizens. The passing of such a law was also 
facilitated by the decline of the British Empire, the increasing disappointment 
felt about Commonwealth newly independent countries, and the increasing 
involvement of Great Britain with the European Community.
The 1962 Act made New Commonwealth immigrants’ entry into the UK 
subject to the possession of an employment voucher. Passed into law in 1962 by 
a Conservative government, this restrictive approach was endorsed in 1965 by 
the new Labour government, which reinforced the regulation on vouchers while 
introducing the 1965 Race Relations Act. Since then, the two major parties have 
followed a balanced and rather consensual approach to immigration policy: The 
1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act controlling entry of East African Asians 
was compensated for by a new Race Relations Act and the Immigration Act of 
1971 by the 1976 Race Relations Act.70 In a measure to stem the immigration of 
Commonwealth citizens, the British Parliament also reformed the nationality 
law through elite consensus, transforming it from a traditional ‘Ancien Régime’ 
subjecthood status to a more sociological, one could say ‘French’ approach of 
nationality.71 This reform represented a break with a century long tradition and 
was adopted without deep debate.
Benefitting from a positive human rights image, a unique geographical 
situation, and an elite-driven political consensus, the early restriction of 
immigration, clearly for racialist reasons, was quite easy to implement. Because 
it was counterbalanced by an active antiracist policy with regard to colonial
69 C. Holmes, supra note 46, at 259
70 On this history see J. Crowley supra note 21, at 131-215 and Layton-Henry Zig, The 
Politics o f Immigration, Immigration, 'race' and ‘Race’ Relations in Post-war Britain 
(1992).
71 Weil, ‘Nationalities and Citizenships: The Lessons of the French Experience for 




























































































migrants already settled, and because policy was built on a political consensus 
which avoided high politicization, the restrictive approach to new immigration 
did not tarnish Great Britain’s liberal international reputation. Clearly, the 
efficient implementation of this restrictive policy was, in large part, due to a 
favourable geographical situation.
3. France or the Extreme Politicization o f Immigration Policy
Despite the decrease in legal immigration registered since July 1974, the halt of 
arrivals of new immigrant workers and the drop in the number of asylum 
seekers registered since 1989, the pressure to control and decrease immigration 
has not let up in France. This is in large part due to the use of immigration for 
electoral purposes despite the fact that the level of legal immigration is low: 
around 100,000 per year while France attracts more tourists than any other 
country in the world (over 100 million border crossings per year). Due to 
frequent verification of identification documents, tight control of the labour 
market, and the geographical situation of France in Western Europe (no 
common land borders with a high-emigration country), the number of illegal 
immigrants in France does not seem to be very high when compared to the 
United States for example. Despite this, the French political sphere is marked by 
the presence of an extreme right party (the Front National), whose platform is 
based on the deportation of all non-European immigrants -  legal and illegal. The 
terms of political discourse chosen by the major traditional parties over the last 
twenty years, in addition to the common policies implemented by the traditional 
political Left and Right, have actually opened two political avenues to the Front 
National. Since 1974, no political leader has clearly declared to the general 
public the dual reality that new immigrants are still allowed to come to France, 
and that their arrival cannot be halted without betraying the French Constitution 
and the international conventions which link France with the rest of the civilized 
world. To publicly make the distinction (as is done continuously in the United 
States) between legal immigration (numerically much smaller than that of the 
1970s) and illegal immigration is very important. For example, a resident of an 
area in which new immigrants are still arriving, upon hearing public 
commitments from politicians concerning the objective of ‘zero immigration,’ is 
likely to come to certain conclusions: that France is being ‘invaded’ by illegal 
immigrants and/or that his political representatives are lying to him. This 
partisan discourse has the particular drawback of allowing the Front National to 
present itself as the most truthful of all the political parties. Although, by 
definition, the French government cannot reach its declared objective of ‘zero 
immigration’, it has nevertheless tried by passing new laws in 1993 with 
repression as the sole strategy to reach this goal by any means. The fight against 




























































































immigration, family reunification, marriages, and access of students to 
permanent status, under the pretext of fighting illegal access to these categories.
This often had the effect of transforming people who would have been legal 
immigrants under the previous legislation into illegal immigrants. After all, 
legal reunification of a family can be delayed, but it is almost impossible to keep 
a father from living with his wife and children for an extended period of time. In 
an effort to combat ‘marriages of convenience’, legitimate French-foreigner 
marriages were viewed with suspicion, and the fundamental rights of those 
involved were sometimes violated.
Lastly, the control of immigration has been disorganized. The police, asked to 
control and possibly to arrest foreign students, families, spouses, illegal 
labourers, and delinquents, yet without a significant increase in resources, is 
overloaded with work. Forced to choose, they often opt for the easiest and least 
dangerous targets: students, families, or future spouses, instead of pursuing the 
truly delinquent illegal immigrants: such as those who have been released from 
prison after serving their sentence and who face deportation, but who, due to 
administrative miscommunication between carceral and police bureaucracies, 
disappear into the night. In short, the most spectacular results of the five laws 
approved by the French Parliament in 1993 were obtained at the expense of 
legitimate foreign residents, while the fight against the most dangerous illegal 
immigrants was, on the whole, less effective. In the presidential elections of 
May 1995, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the president of the Front National received 
15.2% of the vote and in 1996 new repressive bills are being discussed in the 
French Parliament.72
4. Schengen and European Cooperation
The differing interplay between political and geographical factors is creating 
important differences between Germany and France with regard to European 
cooperation within the Schengen Agreement.
International cooperation in Europe has been perceived as a potentially 
effective tool in preventing illegal immigration by some European governments. 
Over the past few years, cooperation between States has increased, as 
demonstrated by the integration of migration problems in the Maastricht 
accords. This treaty in effect states that rules of entry, temporary visits by 
foreigners, the issuing of visas, the granting of asylum, and measures taken to 
stop illegal immigration fall within the jurisdiction of the European Union.
72 The recent developments in French immigration policy are analyzed in Weil, ‘Pour une 




























































































Decisions made by the Union in this domain will still require, for some time, the 
unanimous vote of member-States. However, it was the treaty signed 14 June 
1985 at Schengen (in conjunction with the technical application agreement 
signed on 19 June 1990 -  both of which became effective on 26 March 1995) by 
Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Benelux countries that represents the 
truly decisive step in European cooperation in the domain of immigration. These 
accords created a common external border among the nations signing the 
accords, thus guaranteeing free travel within this ‘enlarged border’ primarily for 
the citizens of the countries in question. However, the elimination of control 
posts on the common borders between these countries requires the 
harmonization of visa policies for citizens of non-member countries, as well as 
common deportation policies which would allow, for example, an illegal 
immigrant to be sent back to Germany, Spain, or Belgium if that person passed 
through that country prior to arriving illegally in France. In reality, the 
elimination of border control posts between the members of the Schengen group 
does not mean that all identity checks have been eliminated as well. Quite the 
contrary. By obeying the regulations to the letter, any citizen of a country which 
is not part of the group entering France from a Schengen member-country 
should fill out a declaration form upon his arrival in France, and then be able to 
prove that his visit is legal if someone asks to see his identification. Before the 
Schengen Accords, the actions of the border police were largely static -  
essentially limited to the border. Today, border police can theoretically control 
identity papers anywhere on national territory. ‘Theoretically’ because in reality 
each country seeks different benefits from the Schengen treaty. Technically, this 
cooperation agreement is all the more rational since the borders covered by the 
treaty are land borders and are therefore difficult to control. Because it is an 
island, Great Britain therefore had much less to gain in entering the Schengen 
group, because abandoning identification checks at ports and airports of 
passengers coming from France, Germany, or Spain would have required the 
British to carry out identification checks within their own borders, which is 
contrary to their political tradition.
Although both countries signed the accords, Germany and France did so for 
very different reasons. Germany’s motivation has always been more political 
than technical. Immigration flows from France or Belgium into Germany since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall have been much less substantial than those coming 
from Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, in 1985 the cooperation in this domain 
represented a step towards the political construction of Europe and, since 1989, 
has facilitated the passage of a reform of the German Constitution limiting 
access to its territory by asylum seekers.73 Later, movement towards European
73 Neuman, 'Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the German Asylum 




























































































unification has also permitted the German government to negotiate agreements 
with Poland and the Czech Republic to limit immigration flows.
France finds itself in the opposite situation. While France has a ‘technical’ 
interest in the accords, signing the treaty was politically risky for a series of 
French governments. Since all its land borders are with Schengen member- 
countries (with the exception of Switzerland), France has a strong interest that 
these countries enforce the accords rigorously. If German, Belgian, or Spanish 
police and customs agents were as strict with the papers of foreigners passing 
through their country on their way to France as they are with foreigners trying to 
enter their own country and planning to remain there, the French police would 
greatly benefit from the accords: less work, more mobility -  thus more 
effectiveness in their efforts. However, if the identity checks are lax, then 
France would be the country with the most to lose, especially in light of the 
current debate over immigration in France, since increased immigration from 
France’s eastern or southern borders would have powerful political 
repercussions. This accord is thus a truly risky wager for European cooperation. 
One could easily have imagined another system: a multinational brigade of 
border police stationed at all external borders. But the choice was made to have 
reciprocal confidence in each nation’s border police to properly implement 
control for the benefit of all the other countries. Still, if the accord is properly 
implemented, France will be the primary beneficiary, with the border police of 
the other Schengen nations essentially screening all incoming visitors long 
before they reach France’s land borders.
E. Comparison of the Tools at the Disposal of Immigration States
With many policy-makers today asking themselves the same question posed by 
Gary Freeman in the title of his article, ‘Can Liberal States Control Unwanted 
Migration?’,74 the answer should be ‘yes’ but with two qualifications:
- Far more effective factors in explaining differences in migration patterns than 
market forces or demographic data are the interplay between geographic, 
historic, political, and cultural factors, which define the environment of both 
immigration policy and politics, in conjunction with the specific institutional 
structure of the government in question.
- It is clear that while some means of control are transferable across several such 
frameworks, others are not: thus it is necessary to choose the policy tools that 
are best adapted to the national interplay mentioned above:





























































































The possibility of successfully transferring such immigration control techniques 
depends mainly on their ‘fitting’ and on their adaptation to the particular 
constraints we have detailed for each country.
1. From a Policy o f Origins to a Policy o f Preference
While it is no longer possible to judge the ‘desirability’ of an immigrant on the 
basis of ethnic or national criteria and to refuse entrance on the basis of 
‘negative discrimination’, it is still legitimate to make some exceptions in the 
form of ‘positive discrimination’ which is practiced by democratic countries 
every day. France is still giving special access to its labour market to 
Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian and Lebanese citizens (while restricting the 
arrival of North Africans and black Africans) and Germany is giving preference 
to immigration from Eastern Europe rather than from Turkey or the 
Mediterranean countries.
2. Economic Prevention
In order to combat the development of the use of undocumented immigrants in 
the work forces of essentially four economic sectors (construction, labour 
intensive services, textiles and agriculture), the organization and the control of 
seasonal labour (as in Germany), and the selection of foreign trainees (Japan) 
have proved to be effective measures. All those affected by these measures 
benefit from such policies: the seasonal workers obtain skills and earn a salary 
which they can then use in their country of origin, thus providing them with a 
substantial advantage in purchasing power compared to that with which they 
would have had in the country where they worked. Their country of origin 
benefits from the influx of resources and a more highly skilled work force. The 
company hiring such workers profits through lower wage rates and freedom 
from heavy fines imposed under the earlier hiring of illegal immigrants. Finally, 
the host State reduces illegal immigration, reduces the cost of border control, 
resource-draining legal procedures and eventual deportation. The State can also 
benefit from taxes and social welfare contributions of these temporary or 
seasonal workers. Of course, in these programs, a fraction of these workers 
overstayed the duration of their contract and remain illegally in the country. Yet 
the continued presence of a few illegal immigrants is preferable to a ‘laissez- 
faire’ policy with large sectors of the economy depending on the work of totally 
undeclared illegal immigrants. Yet the success of this kind of policy needs the 
legitimacy of the State’s involvement within the economy: it makes it therefore 





























































































In this domain there are several types of policy measures which have been 
implemented. In the United States the Congress can decrease the quotas of 
admission for each legal category; this is not the case in Europe where their 
admission is rather based on general ‘principles.’
Some of these principles, such as family reunification, are implemented very 
differently, depending on differences in domestic legal definitions of words such 
as ‘family’, ‘spouse’, ‘child’, and ‘resident’.75 In the US, there are discussions 
regarding the limitation of the definition of family members having the right to 
immigrate to the nuclear family (spouse and children) as it is already the case in 
Europe. This definition would exclude siblings, brother- and sister-in-laws and 
their children, etc. In Europe, where the nuclear approach to the family is the 
rule, the differences are mainly due to the breadth of discretion commonly 
conferred on administrative agencies, when they have to determine if the wages 
or the housing of the applicant are sufficient to permit the arrival of his/her 
family.
4. Legal Deterrence
Restricting former rights or benefits to certain categories of applicants for legal 
residence can be a strategy which helps to discourage some unfounded demands 
and decrease illegal overstays. Visa policy towards tourists has been used for 
years in Europe as a means of decreasing overstays, for example by France with 
regard to African countries, especially Algeria. This kind of policy is easier to 
implement in a country like Japan where, despite an increase in tourism, visitors 
totaled 3 million in 1990 compared to 15 million in the United States and 70 
million in France.76
At the end of the 1980s, the number of asylum seekers in France increased 
from 23,000 in 1983 to 63,000 in 1989. With an ever-increasing delay in 
processing these requests (often three or four years), the person requesting 
asylum often has created a stable existence in France with a work permit and a 
stable job before the issue of asylum is settled. Due to the long delay, it became 
humanly impossible to deport such a person once their refugee status had been 
denied. More often than not, such persons were eventually accepted as legal 
immigrants. In 1989, funding was increased for the OFPRA, an organization 
specialized in determining the status of refugees. The means at the disposition of 
specialized appeals courts were also expanded. As a result of these changes, the
75 R. Plender, supra note 43, at 200.




























































































delay was reduced to six months, appeals included. In addition, the work 
permits formerly given to asylum seekers were replaced by a small monthly 
payment granted to each asylum seeker. Since 1991, the number of asylum 
applicants has decreased and has now stabilized at approximately 25,000.
This method has been studied by American scholars and has been partially 
implemented in the United States. For David Martin, ‘expeditious procedures 
are far more effective in deterring abuse than is a tightening of the substantive 
standards. Indeed, standards can be made quite draconian without much 
affecting deterrence, if the overall system remains mired in procedural delays’.77 
In this area, the United States has imitated European procedures for processing 
the applications of asylum seekers. The process has been accelerated through 
the creation of a ‘specialized’ corps of professional asylum officers in eight 
asylum offices across the country who are to receive special training in 
international human rights law, conditions in countries of origin and other 
relevant national and international refugee laws.78 In addition to the recruitment 
of additional staff, the creation of new positions for judges through the 1994 
reforms has split the work of hearing asylum claims between two separate 
courtrooms. Under the new procedure, the asylum officer only has the power to 
grant asylum and may no longer deny it. If he has doubts on the merits of a 
specific case, he then transfers it to the Immigration Judge in a procedure 
involving minimal paperwork. These reforms greatly accelerate the process and 
deter the filing of false asylum applications in an effort to obtain a temporary 
labour permit during the application review process.79
Some means of discouraging fraudulent marriages could also be 
internationally practiced: for example, the rights of permanent residence or of 
naturalization of foreign spouses could be delayed for two or three years after 
the marriage. Without contesting their right of legal residence, the delay could 
prove to be long enough to deter false marriages.
Other means of immigration control have been used successfully in Europe,80 
but would be difficult if not impossible to replicate in the United States: for 
example, the modification of nationality laws. Nationality laws are easy to 
change in Europe at the national level since amending them does not necessarily 
imply a modification of the Constitution. In the United States, children of illegal
77 D. Martin, Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, 
Senate Comitlee on the Judiciary, 28 May 1993, section C.
78 Aleinikoff et al., supra note 26, at 765.
79 These reforms are clearly analyzed by Martin, ‘Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 
Reforms’, 70 Washington Law Review (1995-3) 725-55.
80 Rogers, ‘Western European Responses to Migration', in M. Weiner (ed.), International 




























































































aliens bom on United States territory are American by virtue of the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the political resources which need 
to be mobilized to operate such a change are currently not at hand and will be 
extremely difficult to assemble in the near future.
Inversely, the reduction of social benefits for legal immigrants are not 
transferable from the United States to Europe for the simple reason that the 
equality of social rights between European citizens and legal immigrants are 
guaranteed by European conventions which are binding on national laws.
5. International Action
In this domain where different kinds of action can be envisaged,81 economic 
intervention has often been seen as a priority.
But the two main tools used, economic assistance to development and free 
trade agreements cannot prevent migrations in the short term.82
Other kinds of international actions include diplomatic pressure. But in this 
domain, pressure from France on African countries linking financial aid to 
cooperation in controlling migrations or cooperation in the repatriation of their 
illegal citizens is more efficient than the same pressure on Turkey by Germany.
Increasingly, cooperation has been developed between neighbouring 
countries, as in Europe with the Schengen agreement. Organized specially as a 
mean to coordinate asylum procedures, it nevertheless carries the risk that 
different countries can reach different conclusions on the evaluation of the 
danger of persecution.83
6. Administrative Organization and Resources
Over the last ten years, the budgets of departments involved in immigration 
policies have greatly increased. More than a century ago, the United States put 
into place a centralized administration to treat the problems linked to 
immigration and naturalization. In Europe and in Japan, the practical problems 
linked with immigration were for a long time neglected by national 
administrations. As a result, this domain of competence is shared by many
81 Weiner, ‘Secunty, Stability and International Migration', in M. Weiner, (ed.), 
International Migration and Security (1993) 21 -26.
82 See P. Martin, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture, Washington D.C., Institute 
for International Economics (October 1993).
83 G. Neuman and G.L. Neuman, ‘Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and 




























































































different departments, and policy implementation suffers from low levels of 
cooperation and dialogue. As immigration was not a problem in the past in most 
of these countries, it is all the more a challenge in the present and the future in 
Europe and in Japan. The American Immigration and Naturalization Service 
could become an example for the necessary administrative reforms of the 
European institutions carrying out immigration, naturalization and social 
integration policies.
Conclusion: The Future of Immigration Policies
The evolution of immigration policies demonstrates the adaptability of the 
democratic industrialized States. In reaction to the increased migratory pressure 
and the extension of rights for immigrants, States have answered by mobilizing 
more legal, financial and bureaucratic means. Therefore the transformation of 
immigration into a worldwide phenomena has not automatically involved an 
increase of migratory flows: when this has happened, it was primarily due to 
legal windows still opened allowing entry. The closure of these windows has 
demonstrated that regulation is possible for a democratic State. Regulation 
means the continuing of immigration flows at a low level. When the level of 
uncontrolled flows is still high, it depends more on cultural and historical values 
than on economic or demographic factors. These facts have to be explained 
clearly to the citizens.
Yet in almost all of these countries some misleading conceptions are 
undermining these policies:
- Germany declares itself still officially as not being a country of immigration, 
probably so as to delay the effects of being a country of immigration on its jus 
sanguinis nationality laws.
- French authorities are lying to their people by maintaining that they can attain 
the objective of zero immigration.
To tell the truth about immigration policy and its context is everywhere a 
condition of the decline of the pressure of public opinion, and a condition of its 
own legitimacy. Speaking openly about immigration is the only way for policy­
makers to decrease unfounded fears and to avoid a deep crisis of values. In short 
term calculations, some politicians think that they can utilize immigration, mix 
categories -  i.e. combine or confuse illegals/refugees etc. -  in order to satisfy 
public opinion, and at the same time make the policy evolve. In the long term, 
they are undermining the structural values of democratic States which are strong 
enough to resist the temptation of having to resort to drastic measures, which in 




























































































Respect of universal values and a good understanding of the phenomena 
might permit a next step in the transformation of immigration policies through 
the attribution of an international, ultimately more protective individual status 1) 
to refugees and 2) to temporary workers.
To protect all humans from fear of persecution, the international community 
could move back to the 1938 definition of refugee, which implied interference 
in internal affairs. The closure of national territories as a consequence of the 
transformation of immigration policies has the effect of endangering people 
living within their country of origin and increasing difficulties in leaving it. The 
right and obligation of interference in internal affairs if human rights are 
endangered should be therefore developed and encouraged.
But above all, governments must be able to read the phenomenon correctly. 
Governments should take more seriously into account the opinion of Michael 
Piore who states that
migrants are a solution because they typically view their migration as temporary. 
Their hope is to come to the developed area for a short period of time, earn and save 
as much money as possible, and then return home to use their savings to facilitate 
some activity in their place of origin.84 85
It is often claimed that because of the decreasing costs of international 
transportation, illegal or legal immigrants can move more easily to the host 
countries. But this argument can be reversed and one can add that if illegal or 
legal immigrants are more mobile, this means that they can also return to their 
country of origin more easily. In a world of rapid and inexpensive 
transportation, where a continuing reluctance to permanently emigrate is still 
dominant among migrants, a round-trip journey is often the best solution for 
many players in the immigration game: immigrants, companies, receiving States 
and States of origin. States who have always preferred persons to be static have 
to adapt themselves to increasing movements. An international status of 
temporary workers, particularly seasonal workers, which would provide to some 
of them the right to work for a short period of time in some defined countries, 
might be in future usefully developed.
In the ‘common knowledge’ on immigration there has often been a lack of 
emphasis on a recognition and analysis of the differences in the outcomes of the
84 Piore, ‘The Shifting Grounds for Immigration', Annals, AAPSS, 485, (May 1986) 24.
85 K. Groenendijk and R. Hampsink, Temporary Employment o f Migrants in Europe 
(1994). H. Werner, Agreement Providing for Short-term Migration fo r  Employment and 





























































































immigration control policies of European States. Rather, ‘common knowledge’ 
has accepted, magnified and emphasized the divergences between nationality 
and citizenship laws in Europe. The belief is strong: nationality laws are part of 
nation states’ histories and identities; therefore, they are divergent. 
Nevertheless, since 1980 the nationality laws of the fifteen members of the 
European Union have changed and are now converging. With one exception: 
Germany. But an historical comparison between the German and the French 
case can demonstrate that many conditions are coming together which may 
permit a German move in a European common direction.
II. POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE IN NATIONALITY AND 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS IN EUROPE: THE LESSONS OF THE FRENCH 
EXPERIENCE FOR GERMANY AND EUROPE
The Maastricht Treaty is said to have established a European citizenship. The 
rationale of the leaders meeting at Maastricht in December, 1991 was to correct 
or disguise the overly economic and financial nature of the treaty. But by 
instituting suffrage for nationals of the European Union in local and European 
elections without first reconciling each member State’s laws regarding 
nationality, the Union accepted the probably false notion that there are essential 
and unavoidable differences between the national traditions of each country. 
The method chosen by the leaders, far from creating a feeling of citizenship or 
allowing for the emergence of a true European citizenship, might rather have the 
effect of upsetting the basic conditions for the integration of resident 
immigrants.
A. Possible Convergence of National Legislation
The primary obstacle to the creation of common European nationality law is the 
belief shared to a great extent in France as well as in Germany that the traditions 
of the different countries would be too difficult to reconcile. However, a more 
detailed socio-historical analysis of the origin of these nations and their 
legislation regarding nationality would have allowed the leaders to determine 
similarities among the laws and to emphasize these similarities. To dispute the 
flawed assumption of the leaders, we will first analyze the preconceptions of the 
French tradition and then compare the French and German systems.
In France, those who are trying to define the specificity of the French national 
identity focus on two points: the first is that the French nation is held together 
and in fact exists through the free will and consent of the people. This notion 
comes from the text of a lecture delivered by Ernest Renan: ‘A nation ... is the 




























































































of a nation is a daily plebiscite’. This notion contradicts the German ethnic self 
conception defended by Strauss, a philosopher, in a debate in which he 
participated with Renan.86 87
The second assumption is that the tradition of jus soli was established in 1889 
by the French Republic, as opposed to the German tradition which is based on 
the jus sanguinis.
But nowadays, 95% of all Frenchmen have never been required to explicitly 
express their desire to be of French nationality, to be considered as French. This 
leads one to ask -  if this is the case, where does this myth of ‘freewill’ and 
‘consent’ come from?
And furthermore, it is important to note that the criteria for determining who 
is of French nationality, as they were defined in 1889, and as are still in effect 
today, have many points in common with the definition of French nationality 
that existed in the jurisprudence of the courts of the Ancien Régime (the 
Parlements) throughout the eighteenth century and up until the first days of the 
French Revolution.
The following period, which began with the issuing of the Code Civil in 1804 
and continued through the adoption of a key law regarding nationality in 1889, 
seems then, in the history of the definition of ‘Frenchness,’ to be unique. For 
this was the only period in French history when, as in contemporary Germany, 
the jus sanguinis had precedence over the jus soli. An explanation of the origin 
of the myth of ‘free will and consent,’ as well as why and how the previously 
dominant criteria of jus sanguinis came to be progressively replaced by the jus 
soli, might then allow a possible means of achieving Franco-German and 
European agreement on this issue.88
To understand this return to the jus soli at the end of the nineteen century, one 
must first examine the history of French nationality. Like all other legislation 
involving nationality, ever since the seventeenth century the French tradition has 
been based upon a mixture, or a blend -  as in a painting, several colours are 
mixed to achieve the desired effect. In the case at hand, two of these ‘colours’ 
are always mentioned: 1) the birthplace, or jus soli: the fact of being bom in a
86 This debate is reproduced in E. Renan, Qu'est-ce qu ’une nation? (What is a Nation?) and 
Other Texts (1992).
87 This thesis is specifically defended by R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in 
France and Germany (1992).
88 On the history of French immigration and nationality policy, see P. Weil, La France el 
ses Etrangers -  L ’aventure de la politique frangaise de l ’immigration de 193S à nos 




























































































territory over which the State extends, has extended, or possibly wishes to 
extend its sovereignty, and 2) family/blood ties, or jus sanguinis, that is to say 
the nationality of one or both parents. However, two other ‘colours’ are often 
forgotten, or neglected: 3) marital status, for to be married to a citizen of a 
certain country often leads to ties of citizenship with that country, and, lastly, 4) 
past, present, or future residence, considered at any given moment for a 
duration, extended or otherwise, in the past or supposedly in the future, within 
the borders of the country.
The mixture of these four basic ‘collars’ on the different legal ‘palettes’ that 
have evolved over the centuries determines what one must do in order to be 
granted French nationality. Among these four criteria, the jus soli is dominant 
prior to the French Revolution -  throughout the Ancien Régime, the jus soli was 
the primary requirement for the attribution of French nationality. And although, 
beginning in the seventeenth century the jus sanguinis could independently be 
used to access French nationality, it is important not to be mistaken on this point 
-  birth on French soil still took precedence over birth by French parents 
(regardless of birthplace) as a legitimate criterion for determining French 
nationality.
The proof of this can be seen through an example provided by Jean-François 
Dubost: during this period, children of French parents bom outside of France 
and residing on French territory needed to request from the king a letter of 
naturalization in order to confirm their status as Frenchmen.89 Children bom in 
France of foreign parents would not have needed to do this. It is important to 
take into account the major changes that were brought about by the French 
Revolution. First, the constitution of 1791 created a uniform nationality code -  
prior to this time, requirements for attributing French nationality varied by 
‘Parlement’ and therefore by region. Second, the Revolution allowed non- 
Catholics, and notably Jews, access to French nationality. Lastly, the Revolution 
led to the emergence of the modem notion of citizenship -  that is to say, 
individual participation in national sovereignty. It was this last transformation 
which would upset the construction of the definition of ‘French’ developed 
under the Ancien Régime.90 For the response to the question of which of the 
monarchy’s subjects’ (then named ‘Passive citizens’) could become active 
citizens of the Republic vary greatly between 1789 and 1804. With the rapid 
succession of rule changes, the characteristics of loyalty and allegiance to the
89 Cf. Dubost, ‘Significations de la lettre de naturalité dans la France des XVIE et XVIIE 
siècles,' Working Paper HEC No. 90/3, October 1990, European University Institute, San 
Domenico, Italy.
90 The constitution of 1791 institutes that an active citizen will be a French male, at least 25 
years old, paying a direct contribution equal at least to the value of three days’ work, and 




























































































new regime were constantly sought. Those who drafted the 1793 constitution 
believed that, considering the conditions of that time, a link, even tenuous, with 
the newly-created French Republic would be sufficient to ground citizenship 
(for example, residence in Paris with an active social presence -  although many 
Frenchmen who fought against the Revolution outside of French territory could 
satisfy this condition). A few weeks later, the Convention decided that foreign 
origin, on the contrary, constituted a threat to the Republic -  so foreigners were 
imprisoned. Finally, in 1804, it was decided against the will of Napoleon that 
birth within the borders of the country was not enough to guarantee the loyalty 
of the children of those foreigners bom in France. Legislators warned of the 
danger the country could face if it forced these people to call themselves French 
against their will. The Code Civil thus rejected the simple jus soli and instituted 
a monopoly on the automatic transferal of French citizenship through a father’s 
direct blood line. Beginning in 1804, this new right of citizenship based on 
blood ties, temporarily stabilized, would be tried out. This legislation very 
rapidly produced unanticipated social consequences that E. Rouard de Card 
presented in this way:
A few years after the Code Civil had been instituted, it was observed that numerous 
individuals who had been bom on French temtory, even though they belonged to 
families who had lived on French territory for an extended period, were in no hurry to 
formally request their French citizenship... They would take advantage of the benefits 
of our social state by passing themselves off as French citizens while avoiding any 
public responsibilities by claiming to be foreigners.91
Long before 1889 and the creation of the Third Republic, which would only 
accelerate the progression that was already underway, the Assemblée Législative 
decided to require a number of these individuals to become French, regardless 
of their individual will. A first effort to write this into law in 1831 did not come 
to fruition. Then, a law passed on February 7, 1851 created the double jus soli 
rule: it stated that an individual bom in France of a foreign parent who himself 
was bom in France would be considered as French starting at birth. However, 
such an individual could still avoid this designation by indicating when he 
reached legal adulthood his desire to be considered as a foreigner. A law 
enacted December 16, 1874 reinforced the restriction, stating that an individual 
as described above could only renounce his French citizenship by producing a 
statement prepared by his ‘original’ country that indicated that the person in 
question ‘had maintained his original nationality.’ A law passed in 1889 finally 
removed all opportunity for a child bom in France of foreign parents bom in 
France to renounce his citizenship: on the basis of double jus soli, French 
citizenship became mandatory at birth.




























































































When the judiciary commission of the Chambre des députés in 1889 
proposed to impose this rule and to develop extensively the role of jus soli in the 
French legislation, it was because, for them, a child bom in France of parents 
who themselves were bom in France is ‘French from the point of view of spirit, 
inclination, habits, and morals.’ The Chambre des députés made no reference to 
public schools or the army (which, of course, would later play an important role 
in the socialization of the children of foreigners), as if to say that this 
socialization could have taken place without the assistance of these institutions. 
But the Chambre des députés ’ decision to leave out these references was also in 
the best interest of the State for two reasons: a) between 1851 and 1889 mass 
immigration had developed, particularly in border regions, and b) more 
precisely Italian colonies in the recent French acquisition of the Savoy and of 
Nice and in Algeria were perceived as a risk of ‘irredentism’. The jus soli was 
therefore imposed more in the name of the public order than for reasons of 
equality.92 If in 1804 the hesitation in providing children bom in France of 
foreigners bom in France with French nationality (and therefore potentially with 
‘active’ citizenship) was based on a fear of their individual disloyalty, in 1889 
the acknowledgment of their assimilation as well as the fear of their collective 
separatism justified the shift of citizenship laws in favour of the jus soli. This 
reform also represented a compromise between the opinions of several social 
groups, as Gérard Noiriel indicates: in favour of the change, were
representatives of French industry, with a vital need forworkers, elected officials from 
industrial areas seeking to stop foreign competition, and those in the military, who 
wanted to rebuild a powerful army. Those opposing the change were the defenders of 
the French race and identity, who were massively recruited from the French 
aristocracy.93
Thus, from that time, French nationality was transmitted by foreign parents 
themselves bom in France to their children just as it was transmitted to the 
children of French parents. However, with the institution of the jus soli in 1889, 
the Third Republic was not creating it, it was merely reestablishing it. It had 
then taken a century from 1789 to 1889 to clarify the relationship between 
nationality and citizenship, as well as to incorporate the definitions of these 
words into the mind of the Frenchman.94 The current rules regarding French 
nationality that were reintroduced into the Code Civil in 1993 have changed 
very little since 1889 -  the most important of these changes was the equalization 
of men’s and women’s rights to access to and transmission of French 
nationality. If any judicial innovation took place in 1889 it was not the
92 Ibid., at 66-67
93 O. Noiriel, La tyrannie du national, (1991), at 88.
94 On the theoretical links between the two, cf. Leca, 'Nationalité et citoyenneté dans 





























































































institution of the jus soli but rather the Republic’s total and complete reversal in 
the handling of an often neglected factor in the attribution of French nationality: 
the criteria of residence. In the time of the Ancien Régime, the criteria of 
residence was very important: when recognition of French nationality could 
only be based upon French parents giving birth abroad or foreign parents giving 
birth in France, the Parlements required that current and future residence be 
established within the kingdom. This was the sign of personal allegiance, both 
present and future, to the king. However, over the course of the nineteenth 
century, the requirement of current and future residence changed to become 
instead a requirement of past residence. In the shift from loyalty to the king to 
loyalty to the nation, this loyalty would no longer be judged on individual ties 
but instead on a person’s socialization and education in French culture -  and 
past residence on French territory was in some ways the guarantee of these 
qualities. The 1889 nationality law thus made a child socialized in French 
culture into a Frenchman by law, whether bom in France of foreign parents and 
educated in French society or bom abroad to French parents and raised in the 
French language and culture.
Nowadays access to French nationality is automatic if at birth the child has 
either a direct blood tie with a Frenchman or a double jus soli with France (two 
generations bom on French territory). Some examples are a child bom in 
Columbia of a ‘Franco-Chinese’ couple or a child bom in France of an Algerian 
parent bom in Algeria before 1962 (when Algeria was still a French territory). 
Acquisition of French nationality is almost automatic for a child bom in France 
of foreign parents, but the acceptance of French nationality only becomes 
binding when between the ages of 16 and 21 the child voluntarily declares his 
desire to become French. For a foreigner without any birth ties to France to 
acquire French nationality, a formal link with France must be created, either 
through marriage or through an extended period of residence in the country and 
a formal request for citizenship. If the link with France that is used to become a 
French citizen is marriage to a French man or woman, the State imposes a 
check, albeit weak and a posteriori, on the request for acquisition of French 
nationality. The request is made using a ‘declaration,’ which constitutes, for 
those who meet the criteria laid out by law, a right. Therefore, all that is needed 
to claim French nationality is that the desire to claim it be formally expressed. 
The State bureaucracy must content itself with checking to see that the 
necessary legal requirements have been satisfied. If the link used is an extended 
period of residence in France, the State exercises a much more powerful and a 
priori control, through the process of naturalization. Today, naturalization is 
granted fairly freely to those requesting it (80 to 90% of requests are granted, 
although the average wait is 18 months), although relatively strict socialization 
criteria are expected of the applicant (a minimum of five years spent in France, 




























































































in France).These rules differentiate the French from the American or the 
German traditions. A child bom in the United States of foreign parents becomes 
American even if he has not lived in the United States and therefore not been 
educated there; a child bom in Germany of foreign parents will often remain a 
foreigner while the great-grandson of a German raised abroad, to the east of 
Germany, without any ties to German culture, could claim German nationality 
simply by deciding to live in Germany. The law of 1889 thus, in reintroducing 
into law the principal of the jus soli and altering the role of residence, 
legitimated the concept of socialization. And it is this fusion of socialization and 
passive citizenship (previously referred to in law as ‘nationality’) which made 
French nationality law unique.95 Instead of contract-based or ethnic origin-based 
citizenship, this concept of nationality permitted, in its primary usage, to 
symbolize a unique legislation based on socialization; a process and therefore 
neither an ethnic ‘given’ nor a simple voluntary act. French republican law 
bases French nationality more on the acquisition of certain codes of sociability 
than on the expression of one’s individual will, one’s origin, or one’s birthplace. 
In the end, these are nothing but tokens of this acquisition.
Thus, the concept that the French nation exists out of the free will and consent 
of individuals is a philosophical invention based solely on circumstance, that 
originally served a strategic purpose: Renan in 1882 had as his primary 
objective the need to differentiate the French nation from the German nation to 
illegitimate the annexation of the Alsace-Lorraine by the German Empire, 
regardless of the cultural and ethnic ties that could be seen as tying it to the 
Empire. For the residents of the Alsace-Lorraine at the time, the desire to be 
French could well have been a daily plebiscite; but today 95% of French people 
have never been required to state their individual desire to have the nationality 
that they had been assigned just as virtually all nationality is assigned in the 
world -  automatically and without any possibility for choice. And as for those 
who can express such a desire, they can only do so under certain tangible social 
conditions (residence, marriage, knowledge of the language, etc.). However this 
logic, which bases nationality more upon codes of sociability and citizenship 
than on individual desire, does not allow French national identity to be readily 
defined. The French legal system, which presents several means by which to 
receive French nationality, fails to respond simply to a question which each 
individual must ask himself: who am I? In responding to this question, a 
German could still respond that he is German because his ancestors were 
German -  a response that not all French people could give. The French Republic 
therefore responds to the requirement for a common identity, necessary for the 
unity of any human group and therefore any nation, with symbolic republican





























































































values: you are French because you adhere (that is to say sociologically you can 
adhere) to republican values; those same values which give French citizens the 
desire to live together. This political identity is not embodied in daily 
plebiscites, but rather in occasional ones, through for example the ‘ceremony of 
voting.’ The vote, a republican rite confirming that one belongs to the nation, 
was historically a means of symbolically identifying the members of the 
sovereign French nation. He who votes is French and a citizen. There is no 
differentiation in the French social imagination, between identity, citizenship, 
and nationality; between local and national citizenship. It is for this reason that 
the creation of a citizenship that is enlarged to include all foreigners or only 
Europeans (that which is decided by the Treaty of Maastricht) which would 
break the bonds between the vote, citizenship, nationality, and identity is still 
very hotly contested.
B. The Implications of the French Experience for Germany
From this history of French nationality, it is possible to discover for today’s 
Germany an important consideration in the form of a question: can such an 
important democratic country, a country of welcome and refuge, continue to 
deny German nationality to the large majority of foreigners and their children 
who live in Germany? All of the countries of Europe have become, willingly or 
not, countries of immigration: foreigners who received temporary authorization 
to live in the country for a short but undetermined period of time usually ended 
up obtaining for himself and his family the right to stay more or less 
permanently. And then what of their access to the nationality of the country in 
which they are living? It seems to me that the profound changes that have taken 
place since 1945 could help to highlight and to favour the similarities between 
German legislation and that of its European neighbours.
Many of these possibilities come independent of German reunification, but 
the most important can be seen as having resulted from it.
- The settlement of the question of territory: German reunification no longer left 
enough Germans outside of German territory to justify that which had been the 
unique and central focus of German nationality law: that the right of nationality 
based on family ties maintains a bond between citizens who are dispersed over 
the territory of several States.
- The intermingling of the citizens of East and West Germany which rendered 
null and void the myth which had previously structured German nationality: that 
of the community based on common origin. The West Germans waited for 40 
years to welcome their brothers from the East; but once the much-anticipated 




























































































of separation and of life in different societies have left them greatly different. 
And, in addition to this, a reality, that of mass immigration, notably of Turks, 
foreign by law but in reality more and more integrated, sociologically quasi- 
German in their activities and their social habits.
- Next, a political reality has imposed itself since 1949, that of a vibrant German 
democracy that the West Germans gradually took for their own, founded on 
shared social habits and on values that the foreigners residing in the country 
share. The bonds that had developed between the West Germans and the 
resident foreigners are such that those in the latter group often sociologically 
seem more to be citizens than do the East Germans.
- And lastly, maintaining the status quo could in the end seem to be the most 
dangerous option to those strongest conservatives who are concerned above all 
with the security of the German State. The continued presence of those of a 
foreign nationality and thus under the judicial authority of a foreign country, a 
population bom and raised in Germany, determined to live and to grow old 
there, could be seen (as was the case in France in 1889) as more of a risk than 
would be a progressive integration of this group into the German nationality.
Thus, objective social and political realities put into question, in Germany, the 
concept of national identity based on the jus sanguinis. Often, however, 
objective social and political factors only lead to modifications of powerful and 
legitimate historical traditions when they are brought about as a result of a 
shocking event which reshapes dominant representations based on new points of 
reference. Lawrence Fuchs reminds us that the shift in the balance of power in 
American society on the question of black civil rights was the result of the 
World War II, which saw Gl’s of all collars and origins fighting in the same 
army for the freedom of the American people.96 This positive jolt was 
accentuated by the negative shock of the revelation of the atrocities of the Nazi 
regime. Lastly, the Cold War created a context that was favourable to the 
unification of all Americans and in general the questioning of the principal of 
‘separate but equal’ which had been the standard since the end of the Civil War. 
The events that have recently taken place in Germany would seem to have been 
an example of this kind of traumatic and restructuring shock -  this is possible 
but not certain.97 French political and historical experiences provide reasons that 
allow us to hope that this is in fact the case.
96 Cf. L. Fuchs, The American Kaléidoscope (1987) 87-109.




























































































C. The Risks of Maastricht European Citizenship
These reasons for hope are found to a much lesser extent in the current method 
for the construction of European citizenship developed by the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Up until now, a central debate in Europe has opposed the partisans 
of a local citizenship attributed to all foreign residents to the defenders of the 
strong, traditional relationship between nationality and citizenship that is very 
prevalent in France. The Treaty of Maastricht brings this debate to closure and 
proves both of these parties to be wrong. In France, the partisans of reform 
believe that reform will only take place through a process of equalization of 
rights -  after receiving social and then civil rights, resident foreigners will then 
receive political rights, all the more legitimate since these foreigners pay local 
taxes. This will require mayors to more equitably distribute the resources of 
their towns in favour of the neighbourhoods with the highest immigrant 
populations. Those in favour of the status quo consider that, on the contrary, 
there is no direct relationship between integration and the right to vote. This 
right, provided without any consideration to socialization, could even have the 
opposite result: the leaders of different communities could negotiate, as in Great 
Britain, collective votes in exchange for the creation of strong ethnic 
communities. An advantage of the strong relationship between nationality and 
citizenship is that it permits an open conception of the nation. Socialization into 
French culture rather than blood relations is the principal criterion for 
membership in the nation. Once blood relations has become but one criteria 
among several (birth in the country, marriage, or extended residence) for the 
attribution of French nationality, citizenship and its corollary, the vote, are the 
means of identifying and unifying the members of the national community -  he 
who votes is a citizen and is French. The creation of a local citizenship, in 
breaking the link between citizenship and nationality, risks over the long term 
justifying a redefinition of nationality around an ethnic conception of an 
‘original’ or ‘true’ Frenchman.98 Partisans of a local right to vote and defenders 
of the republican tradition disagree on this point, but solely in terms of means 
and not in terms of their objective: their common goal is the integration of 
resident foreigners into French society, without any distinction based on 
national origin. The Treaty of Maastricht institutes a citizenship based on 
inequality and national origin which creates a distinction among resident 
foreigners. This does not come without risks.
98 Even during the upheaval of the French Revolution, the link between nationality and 
citizenship, which at that point had to be defined, was never broken. In the constitution of 
1791, the foreigner achieved citizenship through nationality, whereas in the constitution 
of 1793 it was citizenship which allowed him to acquire nationality. If that constitution 
had lasted, a law would have been necessary to formally layout the rules of access to 





























































































a) This new European citizenship is based on inequality because, according to 
one’s place of birth, a child educated in the European Union either will or will 
not become a citizen. In effect, one becomes a European citizen by receiving the 
nationality of one of the States of the European Union. As a result of the 
differences between the fifteen sets of laws regarding nationality (the Treaty of 
Maastricht reaffirmed that they would continue to be determined sovereignly by 
each of the fifteen member-States of the European Union), near-absurd 
conditions of inequality have been created. Let us examine the case of two 
brothers, who, with their wives, emigrated from Turkey in 1970 -  one to Paris 
and one to Frankfurt. Let us say that the following year, each of the wives gives 
birth to one child. If, after the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, 
the child bom in Paris decides to move in with his uncle in Frankfurt, for 
example to find a job there, he could theoretically vote in Frankfurt’s city 
elections -  unable to speak German, and unfamiliar with Germany and the 
problems of the city of Frankfurt. However, his cousin, bom in Frankfurt, raised 
in German society and possibly able to speak only one language -  German -  
would not be able to vote in this same election. The first child would have 
become French at age eighteen and therefore voted there as a French citizen; the 
child bom in Germany would not have become German as a result of refusing to 
make a formal request for naturalization which would have necessitated his 
repudiation of his Turkish nationality. Above all, not being a citizen of one of 
the fifteen member-States of the European Union becomes, among foreigners 
living in France, a factor of discrimination. Real-life situations, extent of 
integration, and length of residence are not taken into account: a Québécois or 
Polish person who has lived in Paris for twenty years has now fewer rights than 
a Greek or Irish person who has just arrived in France. It is important not to 
delude oneself -  it is as shortsighted to think that giving the right to vote to all 
Europeans from the European Union would be an initial step towards giving this 
right to all resident foreigners as it was in the past to think that the right to be 
different could aid or lead to integration. The text of the constitutional reform 
adopted by the French Congress leaves little doubt on the subject -  Maastricht 
represented a closure and not an opening.
b) Additionally, as put into practice without any corrective language, the 
creation of this kind of European citizenship could have as its first result the 
irritation of social and political tension tied to immigration in European 
countries. Those in Europe who, in the debate over integration of resident 
foreigners, create a distinction between Europeans (the ‘assimilable’) and non- 
Europeans (the ‘non-assimilable’) will be comforted by the current framework 
for European citizenship. In France, this reform will legitimate the fight for the 
restriction of access to French nationality on the basis of European origin 
(previously referred to by former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing or 




























































































nationality law evolves slowly. Very recently, legislation was modified so as to 
make it easier for the children of those bom and educated in Germany to acquire 
German citizenship. Nonetheless, a large number of foreign immigrants are 
neglected by this integration into German nationality. The Treaty of Maastricht 
continues and accentuates the marginalization of those who are not citizens of 
the fifteen member-States of the European Union, primarily those from Turkey 
and the former Yugoslavian republics. This increases once again the risk of 
conflict and inter ethnic confrontation on the local level.
Conclusion
The creation of a legitimate European citizenship should take place more 
through strengthening the controls the citizens of the fifteen members of the 
European Union have over the supranational bodies of the Union than by the 
creation of a local citizenship. What precautions have been neglected on the 
road to the European monetary union? How many experts have been consulted, 
how many commissions created and ministerial meetings convened? How many 
late-night negotiations regarding the range of fluctuation of various currencies 
within the framework of a ‘snake’ and then a European monetary system, 
debated hotly to the nearest .25%? How many steps will be judged necessary 
before the coordination of the various economic and budgetary policies will be 
assured? All this will have lasted over twenty years, minimum. Citizenship, 
nationality, collective identity, inter ethnic relations -  these are likely more 
delicate than questions of money and economics. With what speed, if not off­
handedness, decisions on these subjects have been made, without seeking to 
learn from past experience, without taking the time to study similarities in 
nationality law from the 15 member-States. Mistakes made in economic policy 
are quickly made evident through indicators such as increases in the inflation, 
the unemployment rate, the deficit, and the national debt. In matters of 
collective identity or inter ethnic relations, however, mistakes are often noticed 
only much later, in human, social, and political terms. The Treaty of Maastricht 
having been adopted, the fifteen countries of the European Union should reflect, 
with the priority needed but also the precaution it deserves, on how best to put 





























































































Tables III.2. and III.4.: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
SOPEMI, Trends in International Migration. Continuous Reporting System on Migration. 
Annual Report 1994 (1995).
Tables A.I., A.2., A.3. and I.8.: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
SOPEMI, Trends in International Migration. Continuous Reporting System on Migration. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table III.2. Criteria Determining the Attribution of Nationality at Birth
in OECD Countries'
Situation of the child
Legitimate child Natural child Adopted
child
Father or Bom in 
mother a the 
national country
Father or Mother a Bom in 































Denmark x X X





Germany x 4X X







Italy x X X
Japan x 4X <11









































































































S i tu a t io n  o f  th e  c h i ld
Legitimate child Natural child Adopted
child
Father or Bom in 
mother a the 
national country
Father or Mother a Bom in 









































I An ‘x' in a given column indicates that the criterion given hy the column heading is 
applied in the country in question. When more than one line appears for given country, the 
first gives the usual criteria for the attribution of nationality at binh. For countries where 
birth in the country is normally a criterion, the second line gives the conditions applicable 
when the child was bom outside the country. For the other countries, the additional line 
describes a second means of obtaining nationality at birth. The column concerning an 
adopted child clearly does not concern nationality at birth: it has been included here for the 
sake of completeness
2. It is sufficient that either father or mother be authorised to establish their permanent 
residence in the country.
3. The citizenship of the parent must not be a citizenship by descent.
4. In these countries paternal recognition has no effect other than to allow for a simplified 
naturalisation procedure.
5. The letter “n” indicates that adoption has no automatic effect aside from permitting a 
simplified naturalisation procedure.
6. One of the parents must also have been bom in the country’.
7. In these countries, an adopted child is treated as a legitimate child When one of the 
adopting parents is a national, the child is considered to have been a national at birth.
8 One of the Belgian parents must have been bom in Belgium and have made a declaration 
claiming nationality for the child.
9 A declaration is necessary
10 Paternal recognition confers nationality when the father is a national.
I I The parents or grandparents must have been bom in Ireland and the birth must be 
registered
12. One of the parents must reside in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles.
13. Nationality is granted by a decision of the Prefect
14. The Portuguese parent must be in the service of the State or Ins legal representative must 
register the birth in the Portuguese national registry.














































































































































































DC p  £  V
«7-1 dc' ' 3  £5
— O'









*3 £ co 3
3  T3n uO S3 C_ U
>-c -5
3 -W 50 <= 
,3
O ' -  3  —  —










—3 x:.22 C j :
S s •=^ 5 -c 5
JS 3  
C .a I  8 
-O i  g- «S 5 IS ?
■> 5  g  -507 — - =•“ e 3
1 I
rt 3  3C £ 
O ' 47
47 3
2 «0 2 
O £  £• — O ' -vw — £
C .E “.s O e
CL
47 C s
§ t3 2» a c— v> 3  Urn = Oo ■-q'd47n V 100 rN •XI £ 47 1 3 3a u47 «77a </)3 ro











O' H — 3 47




oc ri r-* d oc
r-




0 Jc 0ri oc — m 1— «3 c w «5 c 3 oc









































— "v47 O 'ca




E p  -
.2 -  *«'•—3 c
2 J  .2
as a
-g *oc _5 —
! 2 E 2
r- O
3  O ' 
O  O '







































































































































sC fN — —
oc r "
o r-i







r i  rsi
o  oc
3 ^ S -c .2
u  5 S
1 1 1
•C ocr~-' —
r r  OC 
r  • m
© q
©  r i
o ooc —




c r? i  ^
-  o  c
g £  a  -3ca <— O 
oj o T! ^
c « U
—  *“  C/l
g* -2  rn
" 'S So i2 c
E c®
T f —■<n —’ © <n r-
? Q o .E
C o .5 c -- c 5




—  O ' I t
X 2  c
00
— q 
r i  — n sC — rf
.2 fc







i n  o c  
r i  r n
’* •  J r  w  °  s o1> {/>
^  i
c  ,o
C O h* .*£)









• -  o c  _
f. £  >
o  S3

























































































































































































































































































































































































sC d oc 5O ' d 3CD
— Tf V c*. —
— r r
C '










— T V r i r i
— - 3
CD
nC r*-, _ _ r - Vi V V . |
r i
O ' d  r  i —
d
O '
—  d V. d d ocO '




© r i r - o o c r - r i — O — T j
O ' d —i d d v i d d
V i d -3




oc — r ~ r - r~ q r r <-r r r r i o
r~- —i o c — d v i © r i
*
d ri
O ' o r " oc O O 'n ■<T — — rC
_ Ci
“O
o o sC sC q r r r r q r i ri • -
O '
x —; — d d vi d v i - d re




r - o o o o q V r i — r i —
d —‘ d —; v i sc' v i r i d









O ; o q oc r - q O ' Cl 0
r ~  . 
o c d c — d 00 d
r r
o c dr*0 o r-




1 r i o c  o c r - O r - o r i re
sC
o c d o o d sC d n00 d





Vi q sC q q r- V — —i 8OC





d rrr~ d 5j
ri rr O ' — Ô3
0C-
"re
o — 3 0
o o .2 _C q
_re re E _re "3
E. c c. c. -5 EL ■ =
o c •o Oij c 0_ Ci­ c_ ci­ c_ c .re «Vre re re -X. CD







































































































































































































































































































































































































f " m O ' vC p *r\
vC OC O'' O ' d
«/-, X 0 sC
C" 1^ 1
O CN p
<> 'rt O-' OC r*»'
vC r - kC —
h* CM
C'l p r i p*~,
5?» TT O ' r - C'i
3 s X r^, oc n
CN
C O oc CN
vC O ' d r - '
>c oc
C'l CN
O ' T f 0 p
<* d OC 0 3 d
O N kn oc
O ' fN
T OC m p p
CN (N r n O ' d
0 ** r - i o c
OC CN
C'l OC 7 p «n
r*“i d r - ' oc d oc
C"
r - n
O p o c CN m C'l
r f o c rf- OC oc d
S r i CN
— cn 
O  dTJ- —
o rn m r-j oc
O ' d  ©  d  ©  d
r-1 r -  OO sO CN
T f —
p «/*>
o c  o c— ro tr-i
SC : Tf- (N  9 3
d  d  o c  S c— 't O' in
= 2 ~ u E
a § i  r
^  c c
o ^ U- u. o







5  c — u







O' -a w — w s 3
I I ?
u . =  ~
cT *a  i>
C  c  c .
E  ."E 5 vi
5 S
-a .2U (/) 
aj >  
.2 2 CD c. 
2 «
uc/i CJ
C u e— = t3
«c ^
_E u - 
.£1 o  ab e




■ o  > ,
! i
| i
2 - o  _w u
^  o
! t
g . O 
u - £ E 5 23 <5 —J e  g
u ■a « u -3 o 
C  4J 3  n  u  1/1£ 2 u““ cn -a5 M =— u







E 3 -*5 3 . 3




“  c s
i  « 1  
I l <= >x c:— to o
C  • -
O .52
_  _  2 
o>‘ g  O «  




c e«  1» —-3 _* y
£  § E
r-  >  U .
c/t £  O '
<U '
O
,  — Vtn -a Ql 
o  SJ O ' 1
S, S 2
= .2 c •
. ? !
|  i  §2  — ro
"O - 03 3
jj o u '5j
a> o
2 %<u >




|  5 5 5 e a  o jj =




5 «■ >, 1/5to c/j
0
F v-IU
1 *2- *7 §
1 c/T - 3
! 2 u : = ^ o
■S §
o “
C  CM 
U  “  






35 2  3i *0
o 5 3 ©
n i» t 
£ -2 -  c z
. __ u
§  ̂1 S 3
Q 3i2 co £
'—  oc 
©  o  O '
to —2 o
3 c-■jJ Z)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































O' r i  r ' i  m — «o
ON OC O ' 
rei o  mTT O
! rj -St ^ rn — <N •/% o  «/■»
O ' t t  r -  
OC O  O ' 
V I OC T f
*/“> — m 
VC O'’ ■n- r- rf
—  v ; O  
—■ vcr*i r- Tf
© oc oc 
Tf s© r-' n  >c rf
j





— o .£ ~ re re
 ̂ “ r- 
£  =  O '
re ^’ 5  =





c c .w t/1 ••— re ■£ vC V>
8. S '
OX)WJ cCXj —Si s = J
C  1J
5 «
• =  2c. -r






=  h  ^  S  .=3 «JO— u
S O  ±,c £ «* «_ ~ 3 £ Co C/) C ?j
re .= 



































































































































































— O ' r ~ p — oc T f p p r r p •T) p o p p —
•ri •ri — •ri •ri Ò o d _ O'’ d •ri d r - • r.
n n n n • r.
p p p r - oc o n r r oc sC p oc p p p •Ti
d •ri d —i sC o sC d — — r i r r d r i oc sC r i vC
CM r j n V ) r r rr
p p r r p X r r p p sC r * r i
d d sC — d r i d r i 3 •ri r i r i r i r - n - oc d
r i r i r j n r r r i r j
r r




Tt sC d d r r r r oc oc r i r i d •ri —j M rf oc r i
ir r CN r r r t — OC r r
© r r p r r p p r - p p p r i p p p r r
r~- d •ri ni d r i d sC r i ■ 'T d OC r - — r r sc
r j r r ir> r r n n rr r- •rt
n
cc oc p r- rr p OC p p p p rr oc r t p
r r <N r r SO •ri r i d r r d ■ St —’ •rr d oc d «ri oc r r
r i r r •r, O ' rt rj r r r~
p O' r t O ' r j p r r <n r r p p p oc p
O —i oc d tT d —! — sC r i r r d •rr d d sC —-
r i r i r r r i
tri
C
oc p o p — m — r r p p r r P sc p r - r- o
•ri d •ri d d d rri O ' _; d sC d TT d sC •ri d " 3C
— rt r r o — — 'C u— C_
u
Ì -a! u
i * 31 3
p O © p • p p r r p p P n r- — O ' p — . 1— sD •ri r i d d d —i rr OC d r r oc d •ri d





sC r ~ © r r • n r- r r T) p p — oc sC P r~
oc d r r O'" sC O ' d sC «ri r i o r i rf oc «ri oc
—





r~ r r p r - . oc oc p p oc _ r r •T) r- r i C.
sC <r, oc oc oc r r —i «ri •ri 3 d r  i d sC sC




c/; ■a +£ 03 a











































































































































































































































































—■ oc r- r-> 
C'i r ' i  r - i  r i
X O X (N (N
o' — : o  o' r-’ —
O' S£ o  c
r r  —  r t  T f
T f r - i  O  OC —  
O  O  'T
—  oc * t r -  r -
O ' —  —
s s > , s -£ — cL
O  \C o  O  \Ct OC rO O r~- — Tf
n  r j  —  nc —
C  ^  T ,  vC C 1
—  r  t  r ' i  cr,
—  r - i
O ' o  oc  r i  
r*i «/-. r ~  O  
r -  r r  r-~ oc
sC —
r l  »C h  O  ^  V I M  X  O  X  M
O  
« n  i/~i
r f  o c  «/•> r -  m  —
T f T f  T f SC O  «O T f
O ' O ' —
_f 3  ^  -=
I  i  1  c
• 3  yj
£ t -
*  M W ua s = «• “  —• i* c/i
—  Cl 
> n ~
Si *? ±  c ox H





-O  j — 
E 1 o 
z
n  Tf Tf in c
—  X  T i  IT1 —  T f  h
ri o n
OC —  1/1
*/"> —  O  C'-
I  1
O ' —
ro VC Tf o  r*i
r o  \C  T f  O  OCr i r ^ , r - o r -  
o c  oc m  r f  o
“ « s «
r -  r -  r -
O ' o c  r*i o c  —
o  r -  o c  o  'C
•— T f r -  r i  o  v )
. 2  o c  o c  m  r - i oc
fN  o c  
(N  —  
NO O '
3  — £  Cl
3  —
i  J
•a = a = >. = 5 JS s Ts
= 3 £ s c a £• 3 $  J  g.< 2 Q u . O - ” j Z Z w
-  3  n— <ci13 O ^
o V <_
! -S
>> E  
■- o
^  *o 2 ̂ O- «  o  
C .  *3 >» £
U .2 '■= 7r.X ^  2 o
. | 5 S
I  I  5 -S" = E t
£  .O  =
— r3 O  3  —
” 2
u y
. y  =  =
r -  ClE 3 -O c
7  i:
Cl Cl ~  ^
^  «2 3  • —
- 5 i |
3  «  s
Cl y> 3
U
2 £ £1 >>
a- 1; o z «
>> ci 
“  ci a ~o
•= £ e 3
|« =  S .2 
c " SS «-  ̂ -a c
g -S S S l
£ . s ^
® £ C C2 -3 -3 • =
55 o  y> o ’aj _. y  ci ^






1  5^ Iza> e3
c. S-.
8 5) ■ cz C




ow ClS n c ^
s EP § Sc o ra y
I  J g  ^  3
c -
o r: yjo c 
X o
3  ■ -
0 — 2 
^  JZ  w  
> n y ; -a
*« « <5
c  c l  ^
O  CO
5j C yj ci cl. 
“  3  >N ««« = « S
^  2 
5  3
1 1
• i-  Z
J  .§
5fl .2
5 S S 5 s p J>  Cl —  c _c ~o y o
S *8 2 o g>
•S 5 g |r t  y  -  X i —
•— c c  n  3  . 3
2 ” I  I  “
CO CS yi Z  ^
3  C  
— O
yi _D
g 5  '










































































































































c O ' r-1 —
o
I -
>n ” c i




V , r - © m
© * n C l »n
O ' O ' r~ • n r - c - oc
H i — >c o - r i n
m T t Cl
C l ■o
■o r - vC © DC
O ' DC V» 3 OC CM O '
© r~ o — m m
~~ »n f-f. C l C ' r-~
r*i
C l ■'T
r*l O ' DC o »n ©
*v> CM © o c r - OC
O ' vC O ' OC o »n '■C
CM CM i n CM ©
T r r CM i n
1 m
c i vC DC © OC CM
c i <n <n
m C l C l C l c l
O ' __ CM *n vC ©
55






£ } m r - o O © oc2 O ' sC i n o <nC r-~ vC m vC O
— r - DC DC o c DC DC






DC © u r ~ C -
r - V , © c . <n vO ©
O ' r - ' sC m oc C l —— OC r~- - r ~ ©
»n CM © r~





O ' c i CM O o OC r -
o c m o c~ r~
O ' V t m — TT






X >c o s OC © m
X V ,
O ' O ' c i 'C C l DC ©
r - — *T • _ OC C l




















£ < 2 .2 3 3 rt 2

























































































































































































Working Papers as from January 1994
EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
- depending on the availability of stocks - from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 





□  Please send me a com plete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a list of EUI Working Papers 1990/93
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Jean Monnet Chair Papers
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1999/2000






































































































Working Papers of the European Forum
EU F No. 95/1
Diemut BUBECK
A Feminist Approach to Citizenship
EUF No. 95/2 
Renaud DEHOUSSE/Thomas 
CHRISTIANSEN (eds)
What Model for the Committee of the 
Regions? Past Experiences and Future 
Perspectives
EUF No. 95/3 
Jens BONKE
The Concepts of Work and Care - An 




Education, Work and Gender - 
An International Comparison
EUF No. 95/5 
Henriette MAASSEN VAN DEN 
BRINK/Wim GROOT 
Household Production and Time 
Allocation, the End of the Male 
Chauvinist Model
EUF No. 95/6 
Andrds BARRERA-GONZALEZ 
Language, Collective Identities and 
Nationalism in Catalonia, and Spain in 
General
EUF No. 95/7 
Diemut BUBECK
Gender, Work and Citizenship: Between 
Social Realities and Utopian Visions
EUF No. 95/8 
Miriam A. GLUCKSMANN 
Gendered Economies of Time: Women 
Workers in North-West England
EUF No. 96/1
David PURDY
Jobs, Work and Citizens’ Income: Four 











Changing Parameters of Citizenship and 




Poor Citizens. Social Citizenship and the
Crisis of Welfare States
EUF No. 98/1 
Yuri KAZEPOV
Citizenship and Poverty. The Role of 
Institutions in the Structuring of Social 
Exclusion
EUF No. 98/2
Massimo LA TORRE 
Citizenship and Social Rights. A 
European Perspective
EUF No. 98/3 
Ewa MORAWSKA
Structuring Migration in a Historical 
Perspective: The Case of Traveling East 
Europeans
EUF No. 98/4 
Virginie GUIRAUDON 
International Human Rights Norms and 




























































































EUF No. 98/5 
Patrick WEIL
The Transformation of Immigration 
Policies. Immigration Control and 
Nationality Laws in Europe: A 
Comparative Approach
^ UT0% .
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
